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EDITORIAL

THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH

THIS month will see the end of a long and wonderfully fruitful tenure of the primatial see of Canterbury; and we desire to add our own word of appreciation and good wishes to the Archbishop and Mrs. Davidson on their approaching retirement. Writing in these notes in February, 1926, of the little collection of the Archbishop's addresses, published under the title of *Occasions*, we said:

Ripe in experience, and yet for ever young; seeing life steadily and whole, and yet perennially hopeful; amazingly versatile in the range of his interests and knowledge, and yet speaking with the diffidence and humility which are the surest token of true learning—he commands, as few men have in our history, the attention of thoughtful men throughout the world.

We have little to add to those words for our own part. But, since a large proportion of the Primate's work is now concerned with the Anglican Communion overseas, we have sought a more formal tribute from the pen of Dr. Manning, the Bishop of New York. May we endorse also the welcome which Dr. Manning here extends to the new Archbishop? It comes appropriately enough from such a source: for the present writer was assured on all sides, on his visit to the United States last June, that no one from this country, whether Churchman or statesman, who had visited America in recent years, had made so deep and lasting an impression on the American mind, or so powerfully interpreted England to America, as Dr. Lang.

In two letters which have appeared recently in *The Times*, Lord Hugh Cecil and Chancellor P. V. Smith have cleared the

ground of a good deal of misunderstanding over the Bishops' position in regard to the Prayer-Book; and we hope that their straightforward assertion of the Church's inherent spiritual authority will be widely pondered. The Church can gain nothing by speaking *sotto voce* on that subject. It must proclaim it on the house-tops, not only because it is the sole justification for the deviation from the forms of the constitution now being undertaken, but also because it is the only effective rallying-ground for the positive loyalty of Church-people. Nothing could so nerve the faith and stir the hearts of our people, not least our younger people, as to see the Church launching out into the deep with the claim of complete liberty in spiritual things. They know quite well that Christ's Church can claim no less; they realize that the old order has broken down; and they want the truth faced frankly.

Meantime, we hope that the use of the permitted variations, widely established as most of them are, will proceed with discretion. The kind of procedure outlined by Dr. Lowther Clarke in a note in our September issue seems to us the right method; and it has the advantage of having been tried successfully elsewhere. The really vital issue of the next few months and years is the growth of such a spirit of unity and self-discipline in the Church as will prepare us all for whatever changes, whether from within or from without, the future may bring forth. That will be the real test of our Catholicism—not that in this or that detail of procedure our customs tally with general Catholic practice, but that we show in all the functions of the Body the presence of that Catholic principle of authority which is the Church's greatest strength.

The increase in the size and the price of the *Guardian* is an event of considerable significance; and indications are already not wanting that it portends a certain change of character. There is undoubtedly room for a weekly Church paper whose primary function will be to provide not so much news, as criticism; and if, as we surmise—and we write without any kind of knowledge—that is what those responsible for the *Guardian* have in mind, the step is warmly to be welcomed. True criticism is the breath of life to a society; and there is ample scope for it in the English Church today.

CLEMENT OF ROME*

II

SUCH being the evidence it is open to us to say that the ascription to Clement sprang up somewhere about the middle of the second century. Dr. Merrill does this, and even finds the author of the fictitious ascription. Of course it is Hegesippus;† such is the credulity of this type of critic that he can believe that, in those pleasant talks on doctrine with Bishop Primus, Hegesippus must have casually remarked: "I have a theory that that venerable document of yours was put together by Clement, whom I want to prove to have been Bishop of Rome in the time of Domitian." Or, perhaps more reasonably, on his way back, he called on the Bishop and informed him about his brand-new list, and suggested that now the fatherless epistle could claim the new-found Clement as its author. Dr. Merrill thinks, in fact, that Hegesippus is responsible both for the creation of Clement Bishop of Rome and for the ascription of the letter to him after A.D. 150.

"It is not a rash guess that the Corinthians owed this suggestion of authorship to Hegesippus. He, of course, would get it by mere inference from the reference in the *Shepherd of Hermas* (*Vis.* ii. 4. 3)" (Merrill, p. 310).

Let us proceed to consider this passage in the *Shepherd of Hermas* which may or may not have a direct bearing on the date of 1 Clement, and illuminate the question of its authorship. Hermas, you will remember, was a kind of Bunyan of the early Church; his *Shepherd* is something of a rude *Divine Comedy*. He tells us that he was an Arcadian slave of a Roman lady named Rhoda, and we gather that in the Church he belonged to the still existing prophetic order. As such he sees a series of visions, some of which he develops with archaic simplicity into allegories and messages to the Church: he is under a divine instructress who bids him hand on two of his booklets to two servants of the Roman Church of the time, the one to a certain Grapte who will instruct the widows and orphans from it—she is evidently a deaconess; the other to Clement, who will see to its circulation in Churches outside Rome. Γράψεις οὖν δύο βιβλιδάρια καὶ πέμψεις ἐν Κλήμεντι, καὶ ἐν Γραπτῇ· πέμψει οὖν Κλήμης εἰς τὰς ἔξω πόλεις, ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἐπιτέτραπται (*Vis.* ii. 4. 3).

* A lecture read at Sion College, May 27, 1928. Part I. appeared in the August number of *THEOLOGY*.

† "Dionysius owed much of this conjectural reconstruction of history to Hegesippus" (Merrill, p. 310).

The Clement here mentioned is an official whose duty it is to provide teaching for other Churches either near or far, and possibly to send out important documents to foreign Churches from the Church of the Imperial city. Lightfoot calls him Foreign Correspondent; he may not have merited so magnificent a title.

So far we have fact, and no doubt it would chime in admirably, and there would be no further problem about Clement, if the date of the publication of Hermas' *Shepherd* were in any way contemporaneous with the assumed and most probable date of *I Clement* (A.D. 95). You would have, in the words of Hermas, an interesting piece of information to be elaborated in learned monographs on the official correspondence of the early Popes, and the differentiation of function among the presbyters leading to the monarchy of the ἐπισκοπος. But, alas! what if Hermas published as late as A.D. 140? Can his reference be sustained as alluding to the Clement we are trying to discover, if it was made forty years after he was dead and buried? It is possible, of course, to say that the early part of the *Shepherd* in which the passage occurs was written years before, but the suggestion does not carry conviction. The only other alternative seems to be to shatter the delightful harmony of the reference to Bishop Clement, and agree, as in Homeric controversy, that it referred to "another person of the same name."

But why is the *Shepherd* dated so confidently A.D. 140? For that you must thank Muratori; if he had not discovered his Fragment, things would have been made more comfortable; for it is the evidence of the Muratorian Document alone which carries the *Shepherd* so far into the second century.

The seventh or eighth century MS. discovered by Muratori at Milan in 1740 is a poor Latin translation of a Greek writing; its reference to Hermas is as follows:

"But Hermas wrote the *Shepherd* quite recently (*nuperrime*) in our time in the city of Rome, when Bishop Pius, his brother, sat in the episcopal chair of the Church of Rome."*

The episcopate of Pius was of a little over twenty years, and did not begin before 140. Indeed, the Liberian Catalogue (354) makes it from 146 to 161. He succeeded Anicetus.

You see that to the writer the *Shepherd* is quite modern—a publication, so he says, of his own day, and his own day was probably about 180. But with what is he comparing it when he calls it modern? Probably with the canonical writings:

* *Sedente Cathedram urbis Romæ ecclesiæ Pio episcopo Fratrem ejus* (Lightfoot, i., p. 360). Lightfoot considers that the blundering Latin translator could not distinguish between ἐπικαθημένον and τοῦ ἐπικαθημένου.

the writings that are "ancient" must lie, then, a long way behind it. It is as if we should say that Matthew Arnold was quite modern compared with Blake or Shelley. "He was son of the famous Dr. Arnold and wrote practically in our own time." But why does he stress the modernity of Hermas, and protest so much? Has he any reason beyond the search for truth? Certainly you may suspect him; for the *Shepherd* is marked by its Ebionitic teaching. And it was the custom, as we might illustrate from Hegesippus, to emphasize the *novelty* of heresy in combating it. It is therefore just conceivable that in the interests of orthodoxy the writer of the Fragment made Hermas more modern than he was; along that path we might get Hermas back some thirty years and still preserve his relationship to Pius, and by bringing Clement a little way on into the second century we might get back to the old happy position before the discovery of Muratori's Fragment. But it is a precarious and distasteful process, this pushing of historical characters into contemporaneity, and not very convincing.

It is better, perhaps, to dispute, as Lightfoot and Salmon do, the authority of the Muratorian Fragment. It is certainly not impeccable, this farrago of bad Latin; nay, it is full of obvious blunders. "A copy," wrote Salmon, "both illiterate and careless, full of blunders which sadly obscure the sense. . . . I convinced myself of the entire falsity of the Muratorian statement" (D. C. B., iii. 1003).

Here is no document to which we should bow in the same way as we acknowledge the importance of a considered statement by Irenæus, or a careful quotation from some lost work, in the *History* or *Preparatio* of Eusebius. It is always possible to hold that either the writer or the translator mixed up Hermas with some brother of Pius, or that his informant, on some earlier document on which he relied, had confused the names.

Here is a case where there is no absolute certainty, and one where subjective preference will inevitably tend to colour the decision.

Dr. Merrill, accepting the statement of the *Fragment* and combining it with the ingenuous remark of Hegesippus that he "made a list," cuts the problem with a knife. He dismisses the first-century Clement as an airy figment conceived in the fertile brain of Hegesippus, accepts the A.D. 140 date of the *Shepherd*, and makes the Clement mentioned a worthy ecclesiastic of Rome at the time; then he executes another curious evolution, he refuses to leave *I Clement* back in the first century without an author, and makes it a document addressed by the Roman Church to the Church of Corinth in the time of Pius or a little earlier. It is thus possible for a Clement under papal

direction still to have a hand in the epistle to which we still attach his name; the foreign correspondent and co-official with deaconess Grapte undertook the epistle to Corinth as well as the little job of distributing the *Shepherd*. Thus all is explained, and it is only the meddling Hegesippus that is responsible for the false trail on which ecclesiastical history has wandered hitherto.

Dr. Merrill, of course, gives his reasons for placing *I Clement* towards the middle of the second century. As one reads them the strange thing is that some of them are the very reasons that led Lightfoot to put it in the first. He notes:

(i.) That all Judæo-Gentile rivalry has died down at Corinth; and doubts that the νέοι or younger generation in the first century would have behaved as they did.

(ii.) He says that the age of the Apostles is a long time past (v. 42-44), and that "presbyters in the second or third ecclesiastical generation are in office."

(iii.) He discounts the allusion to the martyrdom of St. Peter and St. Paul, as having occurred "in our generation," by explaining that "in our generation" means "in our times" as contrasted with the days of Abel, Moses or David. Nor does he think that a disciple of the Apostles would have alluded to them as "the good Apostles."

(iv.) The references to the Epistle to the Hebrews would come more naturally, he considers, later than the first century, and the sayings of Jesus quoted in cc. 13 and 46 may very well be "conflation of written Gospel material."*

(v.) The absence of distinction between presbyters and bishops would apply, he argues, quite as well to 140 as to 95.

(vi.) He assures us that there is no need for surprise that later Gnostic errors are not mentioned or rebuked: it was not the writer's business at the moment.

(vii.) He frequently argues that *I Clement* must be contemporaneous with the *Shepherd*, because the latter shows no trace of being influenced by it.

(viii.) Arguments for an early date drawn from the allusions to the Temple are, he rightly says, inadmissible, being purely Biblical: and the opening allusion to what has usually been referred to a persecution under Domitian, διὰ τοὺς αἰφνιδίους καὶ ἐπαλλήλους γενομένας ἡμῖν συμφορὰς καὶ περιπτώσεις (the sudden and repeated calamities which have befallen us), is really a reference to some minor ecclesiastical trouble at Rome.

(ix.) The numerous parallelisms with Polycarp's epistle,

* Though they appear to a colleague at Chicago to spring from oral tradition, or pre-Synoptic material.

which is placed 110, are, he thinks, much exaggerated, and there is as much likelihood that *I Clement* copied and quoted Polycarp, as that Polycarp copied *I Clement*.

It is not possible here to examine these arguments in detail; some of them, such as the probability of the younger generation at Corinth asserting itself against the elders at Corinth at the end of the first century, are purely a matter of opinion; one is inclined to think that anything might happen at Corinth. Similarly with the allusion to the great Apostles, "Could a pupil have alluded to his masters in this way?" it is asked. "Not perhaps in a *private* letter," we may answer, but this is the writing of the spokesman of the Roman Church; so pupils of Temple or Creighton might, if directed to prepare a Lambeth Encyclical, in stately phrases, quite unsuitable for the memories of the smoking room, say: "Remember the views of the great Temple and the learned Creighton on the matter with which ecclesiastical thought is now exercised."

But when he goes to c. 44 for a defence of his position one holds one's breath. "Presbyters in the second or third ecclesiastical generation from the apostles, perhaps even farther removed, are in office." How can this be got out of the Greek? "The apostles," says Clement, "first appointed approved persons to the ministry, and afterwards (μετάξυ) provided a succession, so that vacancies by death should be filled by other approved men (ἑτέροι δεδοκιμασμένοι ἄνδρες). The presbyters ejected belonged to these two classes; some were appointed directly by the Apostles (κατασταθέντες ὑπ' ἐκείνων); others belonged to the second generation."*

It is distinctly said that the Apostles actually appointed the victims of the rebellion of the younger generation. Their appointment must have been before 68; if men of forty they would be seventy by the year 98, and men appointed by themselves in the course of thirty years would, of course, be younger. Anyway it is surprisingly daring to select this passage as an argument for placing the Epistle as late as 140. Difficulties increase the further you advance it into the second century. And this is true as well about the presbyter-bishop argument; our knowledge of the evolution is admittedly very limited, but with our knowledge of the monarchical episcopate elsewhere in the middle of the second century, it is far more easy to envisage the position apparent in *I Clement* as the state of things in the Roman Church in 95 than A.D. 140.

Then, again, the same applies to regarding the quotations of our Lord's sayings as "a conflation of written Gospel

* Lightfoot, ii., p. 133.

material." Yet we are often told by critics that they are not quotations from our written Gospels.

It is obvious that the further you advance towards Irenæus and Tertullian, the less you expect the form of quotation in *I Clement*.

In spite, too, of what is said about Gnosticism, if there were occasion for Rome to rebuke Corinth at the date supposed, one would have looked for some reference to the seething troubles springing from the energy of the various Gnostic Schools. So poor and subjective are these arguments for post-dating the Epistle that this violent attempt to transplant a first-century document into a later environment looks as if it may be due to a subconscious feeling in the critic's mind that *I Clement* and the Clement of the *Shepherd* are connected—and that the one should follow the other into the alien fields of the mid-second century.

Perhaps the most convincing counter-argument for the traditional view, that a Clement was responsible for the official epistle which bears his name, and that he stood in some sense in the direct line of the Roman succession (whether as superior to his brother-presbyters or as *primus inter pares* it is impossible to determine), lies in a reasonable consideration of what lies behind the Clementine literature. These books may be and are false and forged and faked; but they were in circulation all through the second half of the second century. Queer as they are they vouch for the existence of a real Roman Clement. One cannot believe that they sprang out of the void about 170, their whole basis a fraud of Hegesippus years before, or an allusion to a papal correspondent in a work published in 140. Long before that the name of Clement, associated with that of St. Paul, must have been familiar in the Eastern world. Homilies are not forged in order to be attributed to nonentities, or will-o'-the-wisps, nor do the folds of romantic interest gather round men who never existed, or second-rate officials near to our own time. We are accustomed to be told that the accounts of the patriarchs in Genesis are imaginative legends, but the wise critic adds "of real people." We must say the same of the *Recognitions and Homilies*. Romance takes time. It has taken a century and a half for novels to be written about Wesley; a century to throw the loves of Wordsworth and Wellington far enough back to make them, for Mrs. Woods, the material of romance. Tradition claims with reasonable authority that a real Clement lived at least seventy years before the popularity of the Clementine literature.

We have been much occupied with Dr. Merrill's views. And it must be confessed such a critic does students a certain service

as *advocatus diaboli*. It is well to have extreme positions stated in a radical form. It is no doubt the function of radicals to set in array the worst that can be said against existing traditions and institutions. And Clement, the third Bishop of Rome, may be described both as an institution and a tradition.

From the narrow standpoint of the historical critic Dr. Merrill cuts down the ascertained facts about the past to the bare minimum of documentary evidence. Hegesippus, Dionysius, Irenæus, the Papal lists—these must be taken only at their face value. We must not imagine traditions, nor archives now lost, nor may we bring to bear on a special problem the light of interpretations gathered from a wide survey of general conditions; we are restricted to the narrow margins of documentary proof. And yet widely spread traditions generally rest on a basis of fact, and especially traditions of personalities. The days are past in which we could confidently ascribe Abraham, Minos, King Arthur, or Homer to the imaginative creation of a later age. We are then at liberty to affirm that the popularity of the fanciful story of the *Recognitions* affords a plausible basis for the veracity of the tradition of the author-Bishop of Rome, even though it was first completely stated by Origen. This is of course but a repetition of the remarks of Lightfoot; but it comes with added force, I think, when faced by radical denials claiming to be based solely on documentary evidence.

The narrowness of such interpretation is painful. Because Hegesippus is the earliest speaker he must have invented what he said. Because Dionysius accepts what Hegesippus said he and the Church of Corinth could have had no other sources of information about the documents they exalted almost to canonical value. Because Irenæus may have been in Rome at the same time as Hegesippus, or shortly after, he must be regarded, if he happens to agree with him, as dependent on him and his unwarranted reconstruction of the Papal pedigree. Is not this heaping of responsibility on Hegesippus a patent absurdity? Is not the imagination of the critical historian taking far greater liberties with probabilities than that of the traditionalist who honestly endeavours to form a picture of the whole period out of all manner of likelihoods revealed by general study of the time? Dionysius, Irenæus, Epiphanius, Origen, knew nothing but what they gathered from Hegesippus about the Roman succession. That is what it comes to. Can we believe that there were no other sources of information? I do not think we can.

Now if I am asked to give some opinion on the perplexing problems we have discussed, I speak with hesitation and caution. I should say that the line of approach starts

best from Bishop Dionysius' letter. It is something to know that the Church which originally received the letter from Rome spoke of it confidently in 170 as *γραφείσαν διὰ Κλήμεντος*. That carries with it certain implications—*e.g.*, perhaps that everyone would understand who was meant by Clement, perhaps that there was some record of the authorship at Rome itself. The words establish a strong probability that a Clement wrote in the name of the Roman Church at the date to which the Epistle is assigned on other grounds. The existence of the Clementine books adds to the probability that there was such an outstanding author-saint. From such probabilities one would go on to the evidence of Hegesippus' list, and suggest that he had good grounds for placing this person third in his list of Roman Bishops. That he had seems to me a stronger probability than that he had not. I think, too, it is unlikely that Irenæus, who had visited Rome, followed Hegesippus blindly; it is not unreasonable to suppose he had other good authorities for his definite statements. I should be very tentative in characterizing the position of Clement as approaching the monarchical or suggesting to what phase of evolution Roman Church government had arrived in the year 95. The letter is in favour of complete rule by presbyters, yet does not exclude altogether the possibility of authority for certain purposes, derived from the Apostles, being seated in a line of individuals. We are not at liberty to dogmatize on the point;* it was so easy for Eastern writers of the mid-second century to carry back their ideas of what a Bishop was to them to what a Bishop must have been at Rome in the age of Domitian.† That, I think, is all that can be said; there is a strong probability that Clement wrote the letter bearing his name, and that he did occupy (though this is incapable of proof) a position at Rome in Domitian's reign, which in some way justified his being ranked by inquirers like Hegesippus third in the line of Roman Bishops.

* As Batiffol says, "we are not informed in the letter of the existence of deacons at Rome in 95."

† I do not think we are justified in making the allusion in the *Shepherd* of any value for our purpose; it involves, as we have seen, discrediting the Muratorian Canon, which I suppose we are hardly at liberty to do to buttress up an argument. We must be content provisionally to regard the "Clement" of *Hermas* as a coincidence. Identity of name is not an unusual trap in ecclesiastical history; and after all, "Clement" was as common as "Smith" with us.

W. J. FERRAR.

SOME TYPES OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

THE number of ills to which human flesh is heir is notoriously great, and it is apparently becoming greater still. Not only are fresh and hitherto unknown physical diseases manifesting themselves, but of late, and especially since the war, we have become aware of mental ills, the existence of which was not even previously suspected. Moreover, many conditions which were wont to be described as sins, are now seen to be rather cases of mental and moral disease. It is with these last mentioned types that we are concerned in this paper.

We are faced at the outset with a difficulty. We have to ask how far physiological conditions are responsible for these aberrations, and how far they are to be attributed to psychological causes. We have heard much recently of the influence upon the mind of endocrine glands, for example, and there are some enthusiasts, such as S. W. Bandler in America, who are claiming that all mental conditions are derivable ultimately from this source. Without in any degree minimizing the importance of the influence of these glands upon our mental and moral life, we may well hesitate before we accept such a one-sided position. The truth would rather seem to be that both physical and psychical causes have to be taken into consideration. Certainly no sacramentalist is concerned to deny the importance of the physical aspect. An impartial investigation of the facts, however, seems to point to the conclusion that in some cases the physiological side is dominant, while in others the psychological prevails.

In this article we shall confine our attention to five abnormal types, four of them being pairs of contrasts. The types are these: Recidivists and cranks, inveterate liars and sentimentalists, and egotists.

We turn then, first, to the recidivist. Every priest knows this type only too well. He is the person of good intentions who is for ever failing to carry them out into practice. He makes promises, but he does not keep them. He is always making good resolutions, but they are made only to be speedily broken. No man can bind his soul, no, not with chains. It seems to be evident that we are dealing here with the exaggeration of a condition which is unfortunately common in quite normal persons. It is the condition in which, while knowing the better, we choose the worse. This raises a problem which Aristotle thought had escaped Plato, and which he considered at great length under the heading of ἀκρασία, or incontinence. It

cannot be said, however, that he threw a great deal of light on it, simply because of the deficiency of scientific psychological knowledge in his day. This problem finds its classic expression in St. Paul's famous passage in Romans vii.: "For the good which I would I do not: but the evil which I would not that I practise. But if what I would not, that I do, it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me. I find then the law, that, to me who would do good, evil is present. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death? I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord."

It is well, I think, to consider the recidivist in this context, for it is important to bring home to him, if possible, that he is not essentially different from other men. His chief temptation is frequently to consider himself to be an unique, or practically unique, case.

It is, I believe, possible and legitimate to distinguish between two main types of recidivists. Many of our difficulties, especially our practical difficulties, on the subject spring from the failure to make such a distinction. Let us call the first type psychological recidivism, and the second, physiological recidivism. The former we may subdivide into (a) mild, and (b) acute.

By psychological recidivism I mean that form of the weakness wherein the predominating factor is mental; in physiological recidivism, on the other hand, it is physical. As an instance of the latter we may take chronic drunkenness. Before the evil habit was formed there was no physical basis for the evil, except in the case of hereditary recidivism, which we can leave on one side. But once the evil habit is firmly rooted, it can be demonstrated—in the case of drunkenness, for example—that definite changes have taken place in the human organism which render the ego merely a slave to it. Acute psychological recidivism in outward appearance seems to be very similar. We may take as an instance of this the well-known pathological type known as kleptomania. Here too the ego is in bonds, but they are not physical bonds, for we know that as a result of psycho-analysis, or other psychotherapeutic methods, the evil may be dispelled. The reason for this is that its seat was psychological, and not physiological.

Psychological recidivism of the mild type is, I would suggest, a much less serious matter. In its essence it is an habitual tendency to yield to the suggestions of one's environment in regard to some particular class of actions. There are many

occasions when this will relate to some trivial matter. For example, we can imagine the case of a man who, thinking it to be not only bad manners but also injurious to his health to read the newspaper at breakfast, nevertheless indulges in that habit, simply because other members of his household do so. On the other hand, it may concern a grave moral issue. A case in point would be that of a young man, brought up to believe betting in every shape and form to be thoroughly wicked, allowing himself to put a sovereign on a Derby sweepstake each year, owing to the influence of his friends and companions. In the class of bad habits, of which these two instances will serve adequately as examples, it seems to be true, first, that they should be described as psychological, since they are primarily the outcome of mental states rather than of bodily conditions; secondly, that they are mild, because they can easily be broken at the will of the agent; thirdly, that at the time of the action the offender persuades himself that it is justifiable, but on looking back he is unable to approve the deed.

The time was when it would have been said that the drunkard, for example, was acting "against his will," in a way in which the other types were not doing. It is now generally recognized that such an expression is inaccurate, and therefore to be avoided, for what we mean by "will," or, at any rate, ought to mean, is simply the ego in action. Strictly speaking, nobody can act against his will. In cases such as that of a chronic drunkard, battling against the evil habit, we see a divided personality. No doubt this is true to some extent in the other class of cases which we have called "psychological," for no human personality is, in fact, completely unified. Yet there is an important difference between the two classes as a whole, even though they may shade off into each other, so that there may be a certain number of borderline cases. The importance of the distinction comes out very clearly in practice, and should be clearly grasped by all priests, and others who are concerned with the training of character. What happens in the case of the young man who gives way to the temptation to gamble is that he is the victim of suggestion. In his heart of hearts he wishes to do one thing, but at the moment of temptation he is overpersuaded to do another. He had, however, quite sufficient control over himself to refuse if he had liked. On the other hand, the drunkard, in nine cases out of ten, simply has not the physical power to refuse. It is vastly important to distinguish between these two types (especially in the confessional) for they require totally different types of treatment. The psychological recidivist, if he belongs to the mild type, may and should have drastic treatment, which, if prescribed to his

physiological counterpart, would most likely prove fatal. He must be told to make definite rules for the avoidance of certain occasions of sin, and he must be warned of the danger of allowing a single exception to such rules. This strong treatment is possible because we are dealing with a person who is a free agent still, and whose character needs to be stiffened by strong counter-suggestions to the bad habit; these suggestions are supplied by definite rules which he himself vows and promises to keep. In the other case, we are faced with a situation in which the individual seems to be literally powerless. Gentle treatment is necessary above all else, in order to prevent the patient (for he is a patient) from falling into despair. He must be inspired with a sense of God's power as being made perfect in weakness, and he must be taught not to try harder, but to trust harder. But care must be taken to ease the strain for him as much as possible, and he should on no account be given rules to keep. In fact, exactly opposite treatment must be given in the two cases. In the former, a pitched battle should be fought as soon as possible, so that the offender may be forced to take the right side without further compromise; in the latter, a pitched battle should be avoided as long as possible.

There are, indeed, cases where, in what we have called physiological recidivism, the evil habit has been suddenly broken off by a great effort plus the grace of God. But these are exceptional, and we are here concerned with the normal. To ask all recidivists, without distinction of type, to adopt this method would be to court failure, and even disaster, on a large scale.

An important question still remains to be answered. How can we in practice distinguish between these three types? If we are in the confessional, we should ask the penitent whether *at the moment of committing the act* he knows and realizes it to be wrong. If he does not, then we have an instance of mild psychological recidivism. If he does, then (setting aside the case of deliberate wrongdoing, with which we are not here concerned) we are dealing with one of the other two types, which on the surface appear closely alike. Prolonged questioning will usually be necessary to enable us to distinguish between them, but we may be fortunate enough to drop upon a clue almost at once. It is important, if possible, to make this further distinction, because acute psychological recidivism responds readily to psychotherapeutic treatment.

Let us now turn our attention to the crank. As the recidivist is a weak character, so the crank is a strong one. Once he makes up his mind, or gets an idea into his head, as the phrase goes, nothing will move him, short of an earthquake or a

revolution. Once more, we are concerned plainly with physiological conditions. A man cannot have this kind of character unless he has strong powers of inhibition, and these are inherited. In themselves they do not make a crank, of course. On the contrary, they are good, nay, very good, and are essential for that virtue which we call heroic. "He steadfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem." That was said of One who had powers of inhibition beyond all rival. What, then, is the flaw in the strong character which turns him into a crank? I think we may follow Dr. Thouless and say that he is contra-suggestible. That is to say, he is the antithesis to the recidivist who is, as we have seen, suggestible. If a particular course is suggested to the crank, he will almost invariably choose the opposite. "I did not hear what you said, but I do not agree with you," is a remark commonly reported to have been made at a public meeting. This is an utterance altogether typical of the crank. It is because contra-suggestibility is the mark of the crank that we so often find Protestant cranks, for the essence of Protestantism, in all its forms, is to be "agin the Government." We may not perhaps, therefore, meet many cranks in our confessionals, but we shall be fortunate indeed if we do not find more than one in any given parish.

In dealing with cranks, it is of great assistance to know something of their history. It will usually turn out that they are rebels against an excess of authority in their early days, whether at home, or, less often, in their school. Thus, as Dr. Hadfield has told us, men who profess themselves to be ardent atheists are seen to be suffering from a reaction against an over-tyrannical father. Hence they are contra-suggestible against authority in general, and in particular against the supreme embodiment of authority, God. Such persons have to be "humoured"; this is common knowledge. But it is important to observe the precise significance of this. When we "humour" a person, what we are doing is to make suggestions to him without letting him realize it. That is to say, we are making hetero-suggestions, while letting him think that they are auto-suggestions. In other words, we are taking him in. We are playing the part of the diplomatic shopman.

It may be felt, perhaps, that this is doubtful morality, or at any rate, not the highest. Is there any other course open? That depends upon the particular case. If we are dealing with an intelligent person, autognosis will be possible. This is the most satisfactory method of all, though it is not easy to apply. Where we are dealing with ignorant or half-educated persons, it is useless. I very much doubt if any other course is possible than the familiar one of "humouring," joined, of course, with

earnest prayer. We have to bear in mind in all our dealings with these persons that they hold their opinions because they *want* to hold them. Hence we shall at all costs avoid an argument. It will not only inevitably fail to achieve our object of dislodging them from their position; it will also more firmly settle them in their prejudices, even if we succeed in keeping our tempers. If we fail to do this, the issue will be still more disastrous.

We now come to our second pair of contrasts—inveterate liars and sentimentalists. They may appear to be a strange couple to be yoked together, but I think we shall see that they are not so unconnected as they appear at first sight to be.

Now one of the most useful classifications of human beings ever devised is Dr. Jung's well-known division of persons into extroverts and introverts. These two types have superseded in modern thought the old fourfold division of temperaments, harking back to the ancient Greeks. The extrovert, as we all know, is the person whose orientation is outwards; the introvert is one whose orientation is inwards. Naturally, extreme types are not common, and a large number of persons fall somewhere near the middle of the scale; yet it is probably true to say that a majority are predominantly extrovert or predominantly introvert. The former type is sociable, vivacious, and optimistic. Persons of this kind find no difficulty in making contact with the world. They are never so happy as when they are expressing themselves, whether by talking, or singing, or indulging in some other form of activity. They are the Marthas of the world. But their great drawback is that they are shallow; they have what Dr. Maurice Nicoll has called a blind spot in them; they do not know themselves. The introvert is the exact opposite. He is a human mollusc. He is full of broodings and introspections. He is never so happy as when he is quietly reading, or talking with an intimate friend over the fire, with a pipe. In society he never feels at home, and he finds it desperately hard to make conversation. He shrinks from the limelight in every form.

Such are the two familiar types which I have roughly sketched. It was not necessary to do more, because they are so familiar. In every crowd of children in the playground you can see them—the boisterous multitude in the middle, and the silent introverts hugging the walls and the corners, either saying nothing, or else talking quietly in groups of two or three.

I have mentioned, and thus briefly described these types, because I want to suggest that it is only by bearing them in mind that we shall understand the pair of contrasts now under our consideration. Inveterate liars are perversions of intro-

version; sentimentalists are perversions of extroversion. Let us examine this position.

We have seen that the introvert is largely shut up in a world of his own. He finds it hard to make his contacts with life. The result of this is that his great temptation is to indulge too freely in phantasy or day-dreams. If he is unsuccessful as a child at school, his tendency will be to picture himself in his day-dreams as doing well, and to find his satisfaction therein. An extrovert in like circumstances will tend rather to increase his efforts to succeed. Not so the introvert. He will compensate for his failure by building castles in the air. If this process is allowed to proceed without let or hindrance, he will, after a time, be unable to distinguish between fact and fancy. This is a condition which obtains in many children, and also in primitive peoples who are in a childish mental condition. Let me here quote from Dr. William McDougall. "The child and the savage are less cumbered (than we are) with fixed beliefs," he writes, "and they do not draw, as we do, a sharp distinction in recollection between events actually lived through and those merely dreamt or imagined. I have sometimes been told by savage friends of remarkable adventures, involving such improbable events as conversations with animals; and I have been puzzled or inclined to regard my friend as a wanton and wilful liar, until I discovered that he was reciting in all good faith a dream-event, and did not feel that the distinction between waking and dream experience was one of sufficient importance to require mention" (*Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 206). The inveterate liar, unless he is thoroughly wicked, quite definitely belongs to this class, and he can be successfully tackled only by bearing this in mind. It is accordingly all-important that he should be dealt with sympathetically, since his chief difficulty is that he is driven into himself through his inability to get into touch with the rough and tumble of life. He must, however, be shown, as tactfully as may be, that he has been running away from life, and living in a world of his own imagination. He must be warned of the great danger he is in. It must be pointed out to him, in the phrase of Mr. Studdert-Kennedy, that the central symbol of our religion is a cross and not a cushion, and least of all an air-cushion.

So much is true of older persons who have allowed themselves to get into this unhappy state. In the case of children, our task is less difficult, as we can, if we know even a little about psychology, do much to nip this evil tendency in the bud. Especially should we be careful not to give the children entrusted to our charge fairy tales, the central motive of which is an escape from reality. As Dr. Crichton Miller has said, "Let us

give the children Arthurian legends, stories of Drake and Raleigh, Livingstone and Stanley, Shackleton and Scott—stories that are full of hard-earned achievement, the glory of service, and the triumph over circumstances. And let us taboo all fairy tales dealing with the conflict between young and old; all that represents life and progress as unduly exacting or menacing; all that end up with effortless and magical solutions; and all that deal with punishment and vengeance.”*

Closely akin with pathological lying of this nature is that form of lying which springs directly from hysteria. The hysteric is a person who, having been unable to find sexual or other instinctive expression in the normal manner, is driven to a life of introversion, in which imaginations, the fruit of suppressed desire, cause him to depart from reality and truth to such an extent that he becomes totally unable to distinguish between fact and fancy. How far this self-deception can go may best be illustrated by a case which recently came within my own experience. Mrs. A, on opening the door of her house, finds B (a domestic servant) lying unconscious just inside. She rushes to the gate and fetches a policeman. Together they bring her round. Her first words are: “Where is the man? He has gone upstairs; he has got the coat.” On being asked who the man was, she described how she had been to the door and taken a visiting card from a caller, and then how a parcel of books had been brought by a young man. She had closed the door, and was carrying the parcel of books to the hall-stand, when she had been knocked over from behind by a man who had entered the house unnoticed by her. After knocking her over, he had gone into a room on the left, at the foot of the stairs. She had got up and followed him to the room. She met him at the door as he was coming out. He knocked her over again and she was thrown against the stairs. He then went to the hall-stand and took a new overcoat from it. She picked herself up again, and caught hold of the coat. They had a tussle with it; she was knocked down again, and after this remembers nothing more. In due course detectives arrive, and the girl repeats her story. She is cross-questioned, and in reply she describes the face of the man, and the clothes he was wearing. She is unable, however, to say why the visiting card is not crumpled, why the coat is still hanging on the stand with no signs of the conflict upon it, and why she herself is not bruised. The detectives finally come to the conclusion that the story cannot possibly be a true one, which *a priori* it is unlikely to be, seeing that all these things are alleged to have happened in broad daylight. The girl persists that it is true, however.

* *The New Psychology and the Teacher*, p. 69.

It is not until a whole day has been taken up by an examination of the case that B finally admits, in response to the suggestion of the detectives, that she must have imagined it all. It transpires that she has had hysterical fits before. The face of the man turns out to be that of the person who had brought the parcel of books. There is no doubt at all, however, that she firmly believed she was speaking the truth, until she had been made to see the inconsistencies in her story.

In the sentimentalist, on the other hand, we have the perversion of extroversion. He literally overflows on every side of his personality: he oozes emotion from every pore. He is in danger of losing his soul, not by digging a hole in the ground and burying it, like the introvert, but by evaporation. As he basks in the sunshine of society, he becomes more and more shallow, like water in a flat dish. The typical sentimentalist is the man who, waxing strongly emotional in his sermon, exclaimed, "Brethren, I do feel, I feel, Oh, I do feel," and then ceased, failing to find words! I suppose that there are few, if any, of us who would deny that sentimentality is the greatest curse of much of our modern religion, just because our modern life as a whole is predominantly sentimental. Our religion, therefore, instead of being seen to be a matter of good wills, has come to be thought a matter of good thrills. It is assumed that the sole test of spiritual life and progress is feeling. If people feel nice inside, feel good, as they say, then they are satisfied, and they suppose accordingly that God is satisfied too.

Here we have a perversion of extroversion. We have seen that the blind spot of the extrovert is knowledge of himself; and that is why so many of our people have no self-knowledge, and, therefore, no sense of sin. How are we to deal with the sentimentalist?

In dealing with the tendency to sentimentalism in children, we should encourage the extrovert child to develop his powers of thought. Such a child will be none the worse for a little stern treatment to shake his shallow self-confidence. We should always remember that the extrovert is usually of William James's "tough-minded" variety. If we can shake his complacency, the result will be to arouse in him a sense of insufficiency, and accordingly the introvert side of his nature will receive a stimulus.

In the case of adults, this kind of treatment is not so likely to be successful; they will probably be too far gone in the majority of cases. Probably the only possible solution of the problem is to show them the *incompleteness* of their extroversion. That is to say, they must be made to see that by indulging their feelings without acting accordingly they are performing an illogical and incomplete process. They must be made to see the

absurdity of their position. They may be likened to the inexperienced punter, who, when the pole sticks in the muddy river-bed, is unable to make up his mind whether to stick to the pole or to the boat; and so he finds himself in the river. Or again, they may be likened to St. Peter who, in attempting to walk upon the sea, sinks beneath the waters. The latter was indeed in many ways a typical extrovert, and, in his earlier days, a sentimentalist. "He spake exceeding vehemently, If I must die with thee, I will not deny thee." One can imagine the fervour which would surge in the Apostle's heart as he uttered these words. But our Lord brought him down to hard, and indeed homely, facts. Such must always be the treatment to give the sentimentalist. Measure out to him a good, stiff dose of facts.

We turn now to a consideration of the last of the types on our list—the egotist. We may, I think, conveniently adopt the current distinction whereby egotism is regarded as a milder form of egoism. Thus the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* defines the latter as systematic selfishness, while the former is stated to be self-conceit. While there may not be very many egoists, in this sense of the term, in the Church, there is unfortunately a liberal supply of egotists; for egotism is a vice which is compatible with a considerable degree of virtue. We clergy are, alas! only too frequently the victims of it, especially if we belong to the ranks of those who possess assistant clergy. The unpleasant condition of soul known vulgarly as "vicaritis" is one species of this vice.

Let us first of all see how an egotist is made. We have to remember that each one of us has a picture of himself in his mind—that is to say, a picture of his character. This picture is frequently scarcely a fully conscious one, but nevertheless it is invariably present. It is an old picture, as a rule, which we can trace back to the early days of our infancy. "At the age of three," writes Dr. Hadfield, "a child first looks at itself, and this first impression of itself is destined to remain throughout life and determine the character of the individual."* The nature of this picture tends to be somewhat extravagant, in contrast to the actual weakness and helplessness of the infant; for there is a well-known mental mechanism, known as compensation, whereby the mind forms phantasies to make up for the deficiencies and inferiorities of real life. The reason for the operation of this mechanism is that the infant is essentially egocentric. His earliest business in life is to indulge in an orgy of self-gratification—namely, in sucking. The process which we call education consists in the weaning of the child from such

* *Psychology and Morals*, p. 53.

egocentricity to a state of altruism. Refusal to follow this path is the invariable cause of nervous instability and breakdown. If, as in the case of children who are in any degree spoilt (and who has not been spoilt to some extent?), this tendency has been fostered and encouraged by fond and foolish parents and nursery governesses, the distortion of the picture will be correspondingly greater. Egotism, therefore, in the adult, is caused by what the psychologists call over-compensation. An unconscious feeling of inferiority is made up for by egotism in one of its forms. The human soul may well be likened to an iceberg. If the soul is healthy, it should be in a position of stable equilibrium, because there is sufficient moral and spiritual weight below the surface. This is the case with persons of a really good and well-balanced character. They are calm and self-possessed because they have ample spiritual ballast. The egotist, however, is a person who is top-heavy. He makes up for the shallowness of that part of him which is hidden by a great display above the surface. The more he "throws his weight about," as the phrase has it, the greater is the danger of a collapse. Hence the truth of the old saying, "Pride comes before a fall." Humility, on the other hand, is best understood by regarding it as a preservation of a true and just balance. As we shall see shortly, it is the very reverse of what it is popularly supposed to be—namely, professing to be less than we know ourselves to be.

We may usefully distinguish, and select for our consideration, six prominent symptoms or classes of symptoms which characterize the egotist. They may exist, of course, either in isolation or in combination.

(1) One of the commonest symptoms of egotism is undue self-depreciation. The golfer who misses his shot and exclaims, "Oh, I can't play today," by which he leaves us to infer, "But I can play on other days," is an instance of this. So was the lady of uncertain age, who, when opening the door to the parish priest and being asked what church she attended, replied with some affectation, "To tell the truth, I do not go anywhere, I'm afraid I'm a very naughty girl!" This procedure, which is commonly known as fishing for compliments, is very commonly met with. We find it oftentimes in the use of depreciatory epithets and phrases on the part of public speakers. I remember hearing a man who had addressed the same audience for a generation or more begin a speech with the words "Unaccustomed as I am to public speaking." This raised a laugh, which was evidently very much to his liking.

(2) Another very common symptom of egotism is self-assertiveness. We try to compensate for our unconscious or

semi-conscious feeling of insignificance by pushing ourselves into the foreground. That is why, as everybody knows, small men are so often contentious, combative, and pushing, whereas big men are, as a rule, quiet and unassuming.

(3) Another symptom, which is closely allied with the above, is the pluming of ourselves on our defects. This is a very bold method of procedure, but it is surprising how many people have the nerve to adopt it. It leads the little man, of whom we have been speaking, to say openly, "The best goods are always wrapped up in the smallest parcels." There is an old Indian legend which depicts this state of mind in such a delightful manner that I cannot forbear to quote it. There once appeared among a nation of hunchbacks a young and beautiful god. The people gathered round him; and when they saw that his back was destitute of a hump, they began to hoot and jeer and to taunt him. One of them, however, more philosophical than the rest, said: "My friends, what are we doing? Let us not insult this miserable creature. If heaven has made us beautiful, if it has adorned our backs with a mount of flesh, let us with pious gratitude repair to the temple, and render our acknowledgments to the immortal gods."

(4) We should bear in mind that scrupulosity may be a sign of egotism. It is sometimes found that a person is over-scrupulous on one particular point, but is lax on others. In such a case we may reasonably suspect that egotism is the cause of the trouble. For his scrupulosity is an over-compensation for his laxity. I remember coming across a Roman Catholic who had lapsed altogether from going to Mass, who, nevertheless, was rigorist on the question of abstaining from flesh meat on a Friday. She would have given up her situation (she was a domestic servant) rather than break this rule. Dr. Hadfield cites the case of a man who was in great distress of mind because he had swindled a railway company out of a few shillings some years since. In vain did the Doctor try to assure him that we have all done the same or worse. For what lay behind this scrupulosity was a phantasy of moral perfection, which had its root in its precise opposite. When we are dealing with a scrupulous penitent, therefore, it is always well to look for this possible root for the scrupulosity.

(5) Let us note that the habit usually known as "gushing" is generally a sign of egotism. The person who is thus effusive is saying in actions, if not in words, "See how nice and kind I am!" He is compensating in this way for a feeling that in reality he is not very nice, but he thinks, unconsciously of course, to cover up his deficiencies in this way. I have sometimes thought that herein lies the solution of the problem why our

Lord seemed to reject the epithet "good" as applied to him by the man who kneeled down before Him, and said: "Good Master, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?" If the man was gushing, then our Lord's reply becomes intelligible. He was saying in effect: "See how good I am!" He was indeed a good man, but his goodness was marred, as unfortunately goodness often is, by this mild form of egotism.

(6) Lastly, we must note that the whole class of symptoms known as hysterical spring from egotism. The hysteric is always an egotist of the deepest dye, and his hysterical symptoms are invariably a sop unconsciously thrown to his egotism. This holds good whether the symptoms are primarily physical or primarily mental.

Such, then, are some of the manifestations of egotism, which may truly be described as the hydra of the soul. No sin or moral disease is harder to fight. The most important truth to bear in mind when we are dealing with this scourge, either in ourselves or in others, is that it flourishes in the dark. It is rooted in a lack of true self-knowledge, going back, as we have seen that it does, to the early ideas of infancy. The deceitfulness of sin is indeed a byword, but in no respect is self-deceit more deadly than it is here. The over-compensation which we have seen to lie at the root of egotism is always more or less (usually more) unconscious. It springs from a refusal to face facts, and we all know that none are so blind as those who will not see.

If we are dealing with educated persons, and are on terms of sufficient intimacy with them, the method of autognosis may be employed. We can explain to them the great psychological principle of compensation, and show them from their own history by judicious questioning how it has operated in their particular case. It is, however, far more difficult to employ this method with the half-educated, who have not learned, like the well-educated man, to view questions objectively. And the unfortunate part of it all is that egotism flourishes like the bay-tree among the semi-educated who possess the proverbially dangerously small quantity of learning. There can be no question of the enormous value of the sacrament of penance here, involving as it does a thorough self-examination. But we need to warn our penitents from ever supposing that they truly know themselves even after the most searching self-examination. We should be careful to explain that adequate self-knowledge is impossible this side of the grave. Not until we have passed beyond the veil shall we know even as we are known. We must, therefore, be ready to believe ourselves to be guilty of any sin. We should never presume to say of *any* sin, either in

the past or in the future, "I cannot imagine myself ever being guilty of that." If we are able to secure this state of mind, it will be the best protective against egotism in all its subtle forms. For it is plain that this vice presupposes that we know ourselves. It is obviously impossible for us to be self-satisfied once we admit to ourselves that we do not, and cannot, know ourselves. This state of mind will supply ballast to our souls which will prevent them from ever becoming top heavy. Even if all that we actually see inside us is such as to give us satisfaction, we are bound to recognize the possibility, if not the likelihood, that there are hidden depths which are of a different character. Given this starting-point, it may be possible to attain the more distant goal of showing the penitent that his egotism is an unconscious witness to the fact that in his heart of hearts he knows that he is not what he consciously supposes himself to be. In this way he will be led to the salutary, if unpleasant, conclusion that all along he has been an unconscious hypocrite.

LINDSAY DEWAR.

THE FINDINGS OF THE JERUSALEM CONFERENCE

SOME years ago I reviewed in *THEOLOGY* a Report of a commission on mission education in China, and I pointed out whither missions were tending. Last year, when the conference at Le Zoute issued its Report,* I tried in a pamphlet to show that the International Missionary Council was inviting Missionary Societies to tread a very dangerous path. That Conference was designed to bind Missionary Societies to a policy of co-operation with Government in the education of the peoples of Africa. I pointed out that the course suggested to them must inevitably lead them away from their true work and make them the servants of the Government.

Already we hear from Africa expressions of anxiety as the result of following that policy. In a report of work in his diocese in the May number of *Central Africa*, the Bishop of Nyasaland says: "The Government is taking a very complete control of education, and, on paper at any rate, dictating terms and limitations of the most drastic character while still taking it for granted that the missions will continue to pay for the greater part of the cost." More recently I have seen a letter

* Le Zoute, a critical review of *The Christian Mission in Africa*, published by World Dominion Press.

from a lady working in Central Africa who deplores that the teachers in the girls' schools are no longer free to do the evangelistic work which they have done hitherto among the women and girls of the country. It is easy to make an alliance with governments; it is not so easy to foresee the consequences of making it; and we have, as yet, only begun to feel the consequences of the policy accepted at Le Zoute.

I pointed out last year that the Resolutions or Findings adopted by the Conference at Le Zoute, and the language in which they were recommended to the assembled delegates, were involved and obscure. Some, at least, of those who accepted them did so with a lurking discomfort and doubt in the back of their minds as to their real meaning and force; and they accepted them, not knowing quite clearly what they involved, because they were introduced with expressions of Christian faith couched in familiar forms of speech by men who were known and trusted as Christian leaders.

The Conference at Jerusalem this year went much further, and its Resolutions or Findings were carried, as I am compelled to believe, largely under a similar misapprehension. I doubt whether they would have been so unanimously adopted if they had been nakedly presented, so that all to whom they were proposed had seen their real meaning. I cannot here examine them in detail: I have gone into the matter a little more fully in a pamphlet which has been published by the World Dominion Press: all that I can do here is to call attention to the main outlines of the policy actually adopted at Jerusalem, and to suggest to my readers the need of paying careful attention to it; because, as I shall show, it was presented in such a form that its real nature might easily escape the notice of a reader who did not carefully set himself to disentangle the bare proposals from the language with which they were introduced.

At Le Zoute the subject of importance was the proposal that missionary societies, as missionary societies, should co-operate heartily with the Government in the education of the peoples of Africa; at Jerusalem the same principle was carried much further. The Conference accepted in a much more definite form the doctrine that *the Kingdom of God is to be brought in upon earth by the united efforts of missionary societies and Governments to remove social, political, and economic evils*. That was the foundation upon which the whole work of the Conference was based. From beginning to end of the Report, which has now been published under the title of *The World Mission of Christianity*, that is taken for granted.

I cannot here discuss that doctrine; I can only point it out. I know quite well that many of my readers will at once be

disturbed and some will question whether it is really true that the Conference accepted that doctrine. I propose then to examine what the Conference in its Report is declared to have accepted unanimously in regard to (1) the task of the Christian missions; (2) the means which ought to be used in carrying it out; (3) the organization through which it should be attempted.

1. The task of Christian Missions is dependent upon the end set before them. The end of Christian Missions is here declared to be "nothing less than the production of Christlike character in individuals and societies and nations through faith and in fellowship with Christ, the living Saviour, and through corporate sharing of life in a divine society" (p. 11). Now that sentence taken by itself sounds like a clear statement of the truth that the end which Christian missionaries should set before themselves is the bringing of men into fellowship with Christ, and the establishment of His Church—a truth with which we should all agree. Probably many of those who accepted it accepted it simply in that sense, and accepted the later recommendations of the Conference because they thought that they must be in harmony with that statement as they understood it. But it did not mean that simply. If it did, alliance with non-Christian or religiously indifferent Governments to attain that end would be impossible. The phrase "a Christlike character in individuals and societies and nations" deceives us. Individuals and societies and nations cannot have a Christlike character in the same sense. "Christ," the Report says, "comes with an offer of life to men and to societies and to nations" (p. 10). There is the confusion. How do men attain to the life which Christ offers to them? By a new birth, by an indwelling of His Spirit. Does Christ offer eternal life to societies and to nations as societies and nations? Did He say that nations must be born again as nations? Did He offer to send His Holy Spirit upon nations as nations? The authors of that sentence applied to societies and nations, as societies and nations, the words "through faith in and fellowship with Christ" which can only be properly applied to individuals, and the words "corporate sharing of life in a divine society," which can only be properly applied to the members of the Church. Then, having let in that confusion, they later described the task of the Church as something very different from the conversion of men to Christ and the establishment of Churches. They described it thus: "The task of the Christian Church is both to carry the message of Christ to the individual soul, and to create a Christian civilization within which all human beings can grow to their full spiritual stature" (p. 48). What is this "Christian civilization" within which *all human beings* (not necessarily Christians)

can grow to their full spiritual stature? In a sentence which follows they say: It is the duty of the Church "to lend its support to all forces which bring nearer Christ's Kingdom in the world of social relations, of industrial organization, and of economic life" (p. 48). This is familiar speech: this is not what was in our minds when we began by accepting the truth that the duty of the Church is to bring men into fellowship with Christ: this is not corporate life in a divine society, the Church. It is the creation of what statesmen think to be good relations in the world at large. This objective admits, and calls for, support to Governments, Christian or non-Christian, in any effort to ameliorate conditions of life in this world. We are, indeed, far from the statement which we were at first inclined to accept as a simple statement of unquestionable truth. The statement was not simple, and this is the end to which its authors lead us.

2. The means to attain this end are, as I have just said, to support Governments and all bodies of men who seek to improve human relationships and social conditions. But how far should missionary societies go in this co-operation with Governments? Perhaps there is a limit which the Conference set. Let us take the case of education. As I said before, the Conference accepted it as an unquestionable dogma that Christian missionaries ought to assist in the education of whole peoples by establishing and maintaining schools for the people. How far then did the International Missionary Council advise, how far did the Conference approve, that missionary societies should go in this? It went to the uttermost. The case was proposed in which a Government excluded religious instruction in the narrower sense altogether, and the question was asked what a missionary society ought to do in that case? The answer given was that "the education and the atmosphere provided by these institutions are of far-reaching influence, and that the most important factor in Christian education is the personality of the Christian teacher" (p. 24). That answer would justify Christian Missions in providing schools for the education of non-Christians under any conditions. The alliance of Christian Missions with non-Christian Governments is carried thus far. They should co-operate not only with indifferent, but with actively anti-Christian, Governments in the establishment and maintenance of popular education. Obviously the same principle can be applied to every sort of work in which Missions co-operate with Governments.

3. The organization through which the end is to be attained is a political organization. "All Christian forces, and particularly the International Missionary Council, are bound to

work with all their power to remove race prejudice and adverse conditions due to it, to preserve the rights of peoples, and to establish educational, religious and other facilities designed to enable all alike to enjoy equality of social, political, and economic opportunity" (p. 40). We cannot but note here (a) that the task of Missions is set out once more in a form which completely obscures that "fellowship with Christ" which occurred in the quotation with which we began, and emphasizes the conception of the Kingdom of God as attained by social progress; (b) that educational and religious facilities are distinguished one from the other, and that it is the duty of the Christian forces to establish both; (c) that it is the duty of the Christian forces to work for social, *political*, and economic equality. Consequently, since that is the duty of all Christian forces, and of the International Missionary Council in particular, Missions must engage in social and political activities of all sorts. They must "press for legislative action" (p. 41). The International Missionary Council "regards it as of vital importance" that a Bureau should be established to work in close contact with the National Christian Councils and the International Labour Office. It should have as its functions: (1) To supply information on economic and social problems; (2) to advise the missionary organizations; (3) to arrange for joint action between different Christian bodies with a view to the removal of unchristian conditions of life and work; (4) to bring to the notice of Christian bodies and Mission Boards the urgent necessity of securing an adequate supply of competent workers in the Mission Field equipped with the necessary economic and social training; (5) to encourage the formation of groups of students* to investigate these problems and disseminate knowledge with regard to them; and (6) to co-operate with other agencies both public and private in all measures which have as their object to raise the level of economic and social life; and it is noteworthy that here the direction is given that "these functions should be performed with the aid of the regular staff of the Council" (p. 53).

Finally, the International Missionary Council must be put into a position to represent "Missions" "in relation with other representative international organizations" (p. 80), such as the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization. The organization so outlined is very complete, and the task which it sets before the missionary bodies which adopted these resolutions is plain. We are very far removed from that *simple* statement of evangelistic work with which we started.

* This when the world was ringing with the results of student organization in China.

That in brief is the policy accepted by the Conference at Jerusalem. The necessary recommendations were accepted, as we are told, unanimously, and "in an atmosphere in which it became possible to receive fresh mandates from the ever creative God." I need say no more. In a foreword we are told that these Findings merit attentive reading, conclusive thinking, and courageous action. They do. Without attentive reading their real import may easily escape notice; without conclusive thinking men will not know how to condemn them; without courageous action Missions will be carried by them far from their true objective.

ROLAND ALLEN.

THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: A TRIBUTE

THE retirement of the Archbishop of Canterbury from his great office is an event of importance far beyond the bounds of the English Church, or of the Anglican Communion. The age and history of the office give it an interest for men of every sort. The forty-fourth Archbishop was Stephen Langton, the sturdy Primate who wrote Magna Charta in the year 1215, and Randall Thomas Davidson is the ninety-sixth in the line, which began in the sixth century and extends back unbroken to that time.

But to no one in all that line has it been given to make the influence of his office felt so widely throughout the world as to Archbishop Davidson. This is due in part to the great growth of the Anglican Communion, but it is due also to the Archbishop's own character and ability, and to the way in which he has used the opportunities of his office. Throughout the Anglican Churches, and the English-speaking world, the Archbishop's name is held in respect and reverence, and nowhere, I believe, is this feeling towards him more real than here in the United States. The *New York Times*, in a recent leading editorial, headed "Randall Cantuar," said: "While religious controversies are beyond our ken, we could not but sympathize with the Archbishop's disappointment at the failure of the revision of the Prayer Book which he has sought so earnestly for so many years. . . . No Archbishop has ever been so beloved and regarded with such confidence by all branches of the Anglican community. The hullabaloo about disestablishment need not be considered too seriously. It is periodical, like the fit of ferocious 'Protestantism' over the Prayer Book

revision. The old conservative instinct is still strong. The Church of England is too firmly rooted to be blown down by gusts of rhetoric."

Perhaps our feeling for the Archbishop in the Episcopal Church of the United States is deepened by the fact that he exercises no ecclesiastical jurisdiction here and that his influence among us is purely a moral and spiritual one. Certain it is that those of our clergy and laity who still cherish a morbid dread of the name and office of Archbishop, and are earnestly opposed to its introduction among us, see no danger whatever in this office in our Mother Church of England and join with the rest of us in paying honour and reverence to the Archbishop of Canterbury.

In his retirement we feel, with our brethren elsewhere in the Anglican Communion, that we are losing a most wise and helpful counsellor, a great leader and Chief Shepherd of the Church, a true and faithful friend and Father in God.

There are, I suppose, few Bishops of the Church in America who have not at times sought the help of the Archbishop's judgment and advice, always most readily and sympathetically given, to the enormous increase of his own labours though to the great benefit of the Church at large.

To all of us in the Episcopal Church it seems that the Archbishop has illustrated in extraordinary degree in his own life and work the genius and spirit of the Anglican Church. During the whole of his long term as Primate he has illustrated to us the ordered liberty, the love of truth, the sympathy with modern scholarship and modern life, the wide inclusiveness, and the steadfast loyalty to Catholic Faith and Order and to the Revelation given to us in Christ, which characterize the Anglican Communion. A Church which really aims at the Catholic ideal, which desires to give room for every view and position which accords with the Gospel of Christ, tolerating to the utmost possible limit the vagaries, perversities, and even disloyalties, of individuals while maintaining her own official standards of the Faith true and clear for all to recognize, such a Church naturally has its difficulties to meet, and makes no light demands upon its Chief Pastors, but the Archbishop has so met these demands, without partisan narrowness on the one hand and without weak concession in matters of principle on the other, that he holds the confidence of Churchmen of every sort throughout our Communion.

Always generous and fairminded, the Archbishop has shown in recent years a still larger sympathy and spiritual vision illustrated signally in his attitude towards the Malines Conversations and in his course throughout the discussions in regard

to the Prayer Book, a course which will be fully appreciated before five years have passed. The period during which he has presided over the Church of England has been one of extraordinary difficulty and unexampled responsibility. Changes have come upon the world during this period vaster than in many centuries preceding, and, added to all other forces, there came the Great War, shaking the foundations of life and challenging all standards moral and religious; but through it all the Archbishop has borne his part with unperturbed faith and courage, and as he lays down the burden of leadership he has the reward of seeing the Church of England strong and steadfast in the faith of Christ, filled with a deep sense of her Divine Mission, conscious of her shortcomings, but praying to be true to the opportunities of the present and the future, holding her great place in the hearts and lives of the English people.

The recent controversies are not discouraging; they are evidence that the Church is pulsating with life and vigour and that her people are keenly interested in their religion; and, whatever temporary difficulties may exist, that desire for a still larger comprehensiveness and for a more adequate expression of her enlarging spiritual life which the Revised Prayer Book reflected and sought to meet is certain shortly to be accomplished and given its proper realization.

Archbishop Davidson has been one of the wisest Primates and one of the truest Chief Shepherds the Church of England has ever had.

The influence of his great office has been used for the strengthening of the Anglican Churches in faith and life, for advance towards more Christian social conditions, for the promotion of peace and brotherhood among men and nations, for the cause of Christian Reunion, and for the good of the Catholic Church in all the world.

We give thanks for all that the Archbishop has done in these years of arduous service, but still more we give thanks for what he has been and is in himself, for the simplicity and sincerity of his own faith and life, for the fact that he has been recognized by us, and by all others, as a man of God.

It is this which has been the secret of his great influence and has given him the confidence of churchmen of all schools.

Along with our fellow churchmen in all parts of the world we offer to the Archbishop our tribute of affection and of deep respect: we wish him great happiness in his days of retirement, and pray that we may long continue to have the blessing of his counsel and of his presence with us in the Church. And we give thanks also that the work which Archbishop Davidson now

relinquishes is to be placed in the hands of his brother Primate and co-labourer, the Archbishop of York.

To us in America he is already well known. He came to us in this country at our urgent invitation at the moment when we were entering the World War, and we shall never forget the service that he rendered and the message that he brought us at that time. Our feeling here is one of the greatest possible satisfaction at his appointment.

All of us who know the Archbishop of York feel that he is pre-eminently qualified for the office to which he is now called, and that by his own great powers and gifts, as well as by his experience in his present office, he is peculiarly fitted to lead the Church at this crucial time and to meet the demands of the present situation. We know that he will guide the Church with steadfast faith and with high and wide vision. We pray and believe that his Primacy will bring strength and blessing to the whole Anglican Communion, and that under his wise, able, and positive leadership the Church of England will enter upon one of the great chapters of her history.

WILLIAM J. MANNING,
Bishop of New York.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

We have received a copy of the *Daily Readings and Notes* for November, 1928, of the Bible Reading Fellowship. They are arranged and edited by a group of representative clergy under the chairmanship of the Bishop of Kensington, and are published by the S.P.C.K. The Secretary of the B.R.F. is the Rev. C. Drury, 1, Church Road, Brixton, S.W. 2. Both arrangement and contents seem to us quite admirable, not least the brief hints for Meditation at the close of each day's comment, and the many allusions to modern books. Incidentally, the clergy would find these notes of the greatest help in the preparation of sermons.

The Rev. Francis J. Bloodgood, Madison, Wisconsin, has kindly agreed to act as honorary correspondent for THEOLOGY in the United States. He will be glad to supply information as to the Journal; to receive from publishers and others notice of books which it is desired to see reviewed in THEOLOGY; and to arrange for the Journal to be sent to any new subscribers. We hope that he will also from time to time contribute notes on current events in American Church life and thought.

Lord Wolmer's pamphlet, *The Freedom of the Kirk* (S.P.C.K., 1s. net), contains a concise and readable record of the legal steps by which the Established Church of Scotland attained to its present position of liberty; and in view of the growing conviction that the Church of England cannot be content with anything less than Scottish liberties, its publication is peculiarly timely. Whichever way the facts are looked at, they are exceedingly telling—whether we have regard to the much straiter waistcoat the Kirk wore than was ever worn by the Church of England, or to the way in which Parliament agreed to the Kirk's demands as soon as it was clear that the Kirk knew its own mind. The moral of the story is obvious; and we hope that at an early date our own Church Assembly will frame Declaratory Articles similar to those which led to the Church of Scotland Act, 1921. Such Articles might well be framed without delay; but Parliamentary assent to them will, no doubt, have to wait until the Church of England presents a much more persuasive example of unity than it does at present. An incidental result of Lord Wolmer's pamphlet will be to make his readers resolve to pursue that end.

An instructive bibliography is given in an Appendix; it would be strengthened by the addition of Dr. W. L. Mathieson's *Politics and Religion in Scotland, 1550-1695*.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique.

According to the table of contents of the *Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique* FATHER DIEU argues for the dependence of St. Luke on St. Mark for his gospel of the infancy, a thesis we should like to examine, but unfortunately for our purpose this article is completely omitted in the copy which reached us. Indeed, the highly important article of Father Snieders on the influence of Irish hagiography on the lives of the Irish saints of Belgium only begins with p. 603 on our copy. His article, needless to say, is based on original sources throughout, and a continuation of it is promised. FATHER GESSLER examines the question of the recognition of relics in 1611 at Maestricht. Father van der Essen scrutinizes the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception by the Faculty of Theology of the University of Louvain at the beginning of the seventeenth century. FATHER NELIS surveys Mgr. Brenart's "Mémoire sur l'état de l'Eglise de Belgique, ses droits et ses prérogatives." The reviews attain the high standard of excellence set by this important review. Nor can we refuse once more to pay our tribute of praise to the references to articles of historical interest in the different European magazines. The work employed in compiling it is enormous, and the service it renders to all students of history is equally enormous.

R. H. M.

Jewish Quarterly Review. Vol. xix. July, 1928. No. 1.

DR. N. PORGES contributes an important article on Gebhardt's *Die Schriften des Uriel da Costa*, pointing out a number of philological errors in an otherwise valuable book. Dr. Porges further shows (1) that the relation between da Costa and Spinoza is very slight. Both of them made a violent attack on the Pharisees. Spinoza, who was about fifteen years of age at the time of da Costa's death, doubtless soon made himself acquainted with the latter's views and was most probably influenced by him in this. But the outlook of the two men was very different. Born of Jewish parents (1632), Spinoza gradually drifted into pantheism. He was excommunicated from the synagogue in 1656. Da Costa, who had been brought up as a Catholic, his father as a converted Jew, forsook in early manhood Christianity for Judaism. In his new spiritual fold he found but little satisfaction, was twice excommunicated from the synagogue, and died with shattered faith and by his own hand in 1647. (2) That Da Costa did not deny the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and therefore cannot be regarded as a pioneer of modern Biblical scholarship, but that he denied its divine authority, *in dubium vocavi utrum Lex Mosis deberet pro Dei lege haberi*.

DR. A. MARMORSTEIN writes on some unknown Jewish scholars of Angevin England. PROFESSOR SOLOMON ZEITLIN in a note on the so-called Slavonic Josephus points out that its author "not only used Josippon" (a popular chronicle probably compiled in Hebrew early in the tenth century) "but he made use of a corrupt text."

R. D. M.

Zeitschrift für die A.T.liche Wissenschaft. 1928. Heft 1.

SILVERS analyzes the sound-values of Ps. 121 in Hebrew and Greek, and reaches the surprising result that each verse in the LXX has an identical measurement of 170 cm. (This belongs to a line of investigation

unknown outside Germany, which we must take on trust.) The figures differ greatly from those of the corresponding Hebrew verses. The practical conclusions are that the LXX text has been transmitted intact and is itself an original work of art; inferentially we conclude that similar investigations on the Gospels must work on the Greek only without reference to Aramaic originals of the Sayings. The gist of G. R. DRIVER's very full article on "The Original Form of the Name Yahweh" has already appeared in *Old Testament Essays*, a review of which precedes this.

SELLIN has an important addition to his book on Moses and claims to have found in Hosea a corroboration of his theory that in the original tradition Moses died a martyr's death for the sins of the people. The passage is xii. 13-xiii. 1, generally dismissed as hopelessly corrupt. With far less license than most commentators allow themselves Sellin gets the following:

13. By a prophet the Lord brought Israel up out of Egypt,
And by a prophet he was preserved.
- 14a. Ephraim provoked him (Moses) to anger most bitterly.
15. When Ephraim spake contentious words,
He bore it in Israel.
And he became guilty in regard to Baal and died.
- 14b. His blood will (the Lord) throw upon him (Ephraim)
And his reproach will he requite to him.

The original form of 14b will have been: "His blood I will throw upon you," which was altered as often in our present text of the prophets. The same idea is to be found in vi. 5: "Therefore have I hewed them by the prophets"—a quite hopeless sentence. The original is preserved in Theodotion's ἀπέκτεινα δι' ὑμᾶς τοὺς προφῆτας ἐν ῥήματι στόματός μου ("Because of you I slew the prophets by the word of my mouth"). In Hosea all the essentials of the later idea of martyrdom are found—the same act is regarded as a crime on the part of the people, a voluntary suffering on the part of the martyr, and an act of God's will.

A. WEISER contributes a study of Amos iv. 6-13. The Editor's Chronicle is very full. He notes the present concentrating of interest upon problems of biblical theology and comparative religion and recalls a recent warning to theologians not to neglect Wellhausen and his life's work.

W. K. L. C.

The Journal of Religion. Vol. viii. No. 3.

That there are two different movements in the history of Christianity corresponding exactly to two names "Jesus" and "Christ" may be a generalization containing some element of truth, but it is, surely, so sweeping a generalization that the balancing statement of a very close continuity between them is hardly sufficient. On the basis of this assumption the opening article in the July number of the *Journal of Religion* sets out to prove that the second or "Christ" phase owes very much to Orphism, which was widely diffused in Tarsus, the native land of St. Paul, who was deeply influenced by it. "The origin of the Pauline theology and mysticism is to be sought in Orphism." But however distinguished be the author of this thesis, we beg leave to remain unconverted. The origin of Pauline theology and mysticism is, we submit, Jesus Christ our Lord. An interesting account of the relation between Church and State

in Mexico ends with a sentence to which recent events have added a special interest. "It is generally believed that if General Obregon succeeds to the presidency, which now seems a certainty, he will effect a compromise which no doubt the Catholic leaders, having lost so much, would accept at considerable sacrifice of former positions." H. S. M.

Zeitschrift für die N.T.liche Wissenschaft. 1928. Heft 1.

ADOLF V. HARNACK opens the year with a monograph on *κόπος*, *κοπιᾶν* in N.T. usage. The implication of the word is toilsome and little esteemed labour, e.g., of the gardener, reaper, or gravedigger. It seems to have been given a Christian application by St Paul, which before long died out. The most interesting problem which arises is the meaning of 1 Thess. v. 12: "We beseech you, brethren, to know *them that labour* among you, and are over you in the Lord, and admonish you." Is this an official activity? Von Harnack concludes that there was a definite group of "labourers," to whom was assigned the task of supervision and admonition. Most of them will have been presbyters, and from their two functions "bishops and deacons" (Phil. i. 1) will have evolved very soon. The original "labourers" may be supposed to have had a *charisma* for their work, to which the laying on of hands was probably attached.

LOHMEYER, whose Commentary on the Apocalypse was recently reviewed in these columns, has a most interesting essay on the plan of the Fourth Gospel. The interest of the Evangelist in the numbers Three and Seven (*cf.* the three-fold charge to St Peter in xxi. and the seven "signs") has often been remarked. Lohmeyer shows that the whole book is shot through with this schematism. One section of his analysis may be quoted. Chapters ii.-vi. form a section filled with journeyings in Palestine. 1. *Cana* ii. 1-11; 2. *Jerusalem* ii. 12-iii. 21, divided into (a) Cleansing of the temple ii. 12-22, (b) activity of Jesus, ii. 23-25, (c) Nicodemus iii. 1-21; 3. *Ænon in Salem* iii. 22-36; 4. *Sychar* iv. 1-42, divided into (a) Jesus at the well 1-6, (b) first subject of conversation 7-15, (c) second subject 16-18, (d) third subject 19-27, (e) return of the disciples 28-30, (f) Jesus and the disciples 31-38, (g) Jesus and the Samaritans 39-42; 5. *Cana again* iv. 42-54; 6. *Jerusalem* v. 1-47, divided into (a) the healing of the paralytic 1-9, (b) the conflict about the sabbath 9-18, (c) discourse of Jesus 19-47; 7. *The Lake of Galilee* vi. 1-72, divided into (a) the feeding 1-15, (b) walking on the sea 16-21, (c) first discourse 22-40, (d) second 41-51, (e) third 52-59, (f) address to the disciples, 60-65 (g) Peter's confession, 66-72.

The fact that the seven- and-three-fold plan is inseparable from the Gospel shows that it is an artistic whole and rebuts partition theories. Exactly the same phenomenon is to be observed in the Apocalypse and, if on other grounds we could urge identity of authors, would strengthen the argument greatly.

W. MUNDLE discusses the position of the Apostles in the Acts. He concludes that for St Luke the Twelve acted as a college, by the side of which stood St Paul, representing the later Gentile Church, with equal power. He argues against the excessive hierarchical position ascribed by Holl and others to Jerusalem as the mother Church.

E. PETERSON in a very learned article on primitive Christianity and Mandaism strives to reduce the curious sect of the Mandæans to their true proportions. They are first to be traced in the 7th century A.D.

in Mesopotamia. The argument that they once lived in Palestine because their language has West-Semitic loan words is valueless; it also has Greek loan words and no one suggests that the Mandæans lived in Greece!

An exceptionally valuable number is concluded by J. JEREMIAS' article on the Sabbatical year in N.T. times. Whereas it was possible to observe it without serious consequences when all went well, if war or pestilence or drought coincided with the year following that in which the fields lay fallow, a grievous famine resulted. Jeremias illustrates his thesis from Josephus, but the famine under Claudius is his main theme (Acts xi. 27-30, xii. 25). The Apostolic Council (48 or 49 A.D.) took place when the consequences of the famine were being felt. The visit of Paul and Barnabas with alms in Acts xi. is identical with that of xv., Luke having made two visits out of one. The charge in Gal. ii. 10, to remember the poor, may be very simply explained—the generosity of the Antioch Church was to be an example to the rest of the Gentile Christians. Seven years later, when St. Paul paid his last visit to Jerusalem, the consequences of the next Sabbatical year were to be expected, and in view of the sad experiences of the previous one the Apostle was prepared with relief.

W. K. L. C.

Anglican Theological Review.

This exceedingly interesting and well-informed quarterly, edited by Dr. Frederick C. Grant and Dr. Burton S. Easton, two of the leading theologians in America, affords a good example of the wide intellectual sympathies of the Church across the water. Probably no better account of the teaching of Karl Barth and his movement has been given than that contributed by G. G. Kullmann to this review last autumn; while Old Testament and New, Christian doctrine and ethics, history, philosophy, and comparative religion are well represented in more recent numbers.

Barth's theology is something that will unquestionably have to be reckoned with as the years go by, standing as it does for the recovery by Protestantism of that emphasis on God's power and man's sinfulness which was once its dominant note. Thus, we are to think of "God not as the *demonstrandum*, but as the *demonstrans*. . . . We do not think Him out, we think *after* Him, according to Him." Man is made in God's image, but "the man we know is a fallen man, whose need and misery we know better than his glory." True religion is therefore always eschatological. "Our quest for God is always a quest out of despair, at best *de profundis*, at best a cry, 'O God, why hast Thou forsaken me?'" The Cross is God's "No" to human effort at its best: what makes it a Gospel is the Resurrection, which is God's "Yes" of pardon and redemption.

Barth describes the Resurrection as belonging to a type of fact which he calls "meta-historical," a term which may prove of great importance for theology, all the more as it has lately appeared in quite another quarter. The *S.S.M. Quarterly Review* for June, 1928, contains an interesting report of the second Anglo-Russian Student Conference held in January, 1927. The word "meta-history" had been used at the previous conference, and is explained by Professor Besobrasoff by the analogy of an icon. "An icon is not a portrait. An icon is devoid of naturalism. Its conventionally angular forms are not met with in life. The unrealism of the icon seems to point to the mystery of another life. . . . There exist higher requirements sought for from an icon which cannot be satisfied

by a historically exact, true, and even inspiring picture of a religious subject. The difference between such a picture and an icon corresponds to a historical and a meta-historical interpretation of the Word of God."

Have we here a clue to the difference between the Synoptic Gospels and the Fourth?

E. G. S.

Theologische Blätter. July.

PROFESSOR E. PETERSON contributes an obituary notice of the philosopher Max Scheler, who died May 19 of this year, and gives an appreciation of his work. In his opinion, Max Scheler revived by his philosophy the religious consciousness of his time, and gave an impulse to a return to the Catholic Faith. Protestantism is no longer the obvious and only possible presupposition of the spiritual and religious life, but, as in England, Catholicism has come into view as a possible solution of the religious problem.

DR. H. M. MÜLLER reviews Karl Barth's *Outline of Christian Dogmatics* (Part I.), which deals with the doctrine of the Word of God. Barth interprets this in the two forms of scripture and preaching, by which the revelation of God is mediated.

Other articles deal with the international high-school courses at Davos and the call of the prophet Amos.

L. P.

NOTE.—In future the *Anglican Theological Review* will be surveyed by the Rev. J. O. Cobham, formerly of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and now on the staff of St. Thomas's Church, Winchester.

REVIEWS

THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE. By J. M. E. McTaggart. Vol. ii.
Edited by C. D. Broad. Cambridge University Press. 30s.

The first part of this brilliant and splendidly ambitious philosophical treatise was published in 1921; it is a consequence of the extreme conscientiousness with which its author was accustomed to subject his writings to repeated revisions before allowing them to appear that its second and longer half should only have been issued after his premature and lamented death, under the editorship of a friend and colleague. Dr. Broad has discharged the duties of editor with exemplary piety. There is hardly an error of the press in the whole large volume, which is moreover provided with a copious analytical Table of Contents, absolutely indispensable for the serious reader, but representing what must have been a heavy editorial labour.

It is not, perhaps, likely that the complete work will win numerous converts to the very elaborate theory of the universe it propounds; probably McTaggart's reading of the world was too distinctively personal, too genuinely original, not to say sometimes whimsical, to make widely effective propaganda. But the worth of a classic in metaphysics is never to be estimated by the number of disciples it wins, or why should we still continue to set the value we do on such books as Plato's *Republic* or Spinoza's *Ethics*? *The Nature of Existence* has, in its thought-provoking quality, a value wholly independent of the amount of agreement it can procure for its conclusions. For real originality of conception, candour in admitting and facing difficulties, high dialectical acumen, and that rare quality in a metaphysician, the courage which will not let itself be frightened by "common sense" from carrying out principles to their full consequences, McTaggart's last and most elaborate book has, indeed, few equals in the whole philosophical literature of Great Britain. In its resolute prosecution of principles to their full consequences and its conscientious anxiety to leave no "objections" unconsidered, no less than in its dialectical ingenuity, it provokes comparison with the best work of "medieval scholasticism"; it is like the real scholasticism also in being throughout concerned with no mere curious speculations, but with the issue of supreme practical concern to all of us, the "ultimate felicity" of man.

In a sense all the author's previous books may be said to have been a preparation for this final labour. Through all of them one could trace the main lines of a type of metaphysical

idealism which McTaggart professed to find in the works of Hegel, though many readers must always have had the secret suspicion that if he found the doctrine there, it was largely because he brought its main tenets with him to the task of interpretation. One knew already that in a substantive constructive work by McTaggart one would meet the general conception of the universe as a collection of eternal and underived "selves," with no supreme Creator or ruler, united by a *nexus amoris* and destined to a final felicity of perfect goodness, combined with incalculably great happiness. What *The Nature of Existence* professes to do is to provide a rigorous demonstration that the universe is constructed on a pattern which requires that it should be constituted by the mutual relations of eternal and "unoriginate" parts, together with a sufficiently probable proof that such parts must be what we know as conscious selves, along with a highly probable forecast of the route by which these selves will in the end reach their high destiny. The main doctrines of the book, the eternity of all the selves, the absence from the system of any self sufficiently dominant to be called God, the certainty that the future before all of them is overwhelmingly good, the high probability that each of them has many lives and deaths behind it in the past, and many before it in the future, had all been made familiar to us by the author's *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*. What is new in the final work is the proof offered of these conclusions by methods based on the very un-Hegelian "mathematical logic" of contemporary Cambridge. If one may conjecture the history of the writer's mind from his works, one would suppose, I think, that a mind strongly disposed by native temperament to a certain interpretation of life passed successively under the influences, first of Hegel, then of Spinoza, finally, but not until after the publication of the book on *Cosmology*, under that of Leibniz and Messrs, Moore and Russell. The influence most "conspicuous by its absence" from the final construction is precisely that which has been most strongly marked in most British "Hegelianism," that of the great Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. In the formation of McTaggart's philosophy, it is hardly too much to say that Aristotle does not count, and Plato only counts in respect of his imaginative myths of pre-existence and reincarnation. *Appearance and Reality* was once described by an eminent philosopher as an attempt to combine the conclusions of Hegel with the methods of Hume; it might be about as correct a formula to say that *The Nature of Existence* is an attempt to justify what the author takes to be the positions of Hegel by the methods of Leibniz. The neglect of the Aristotelian tradition gives the work a certain freshness and novelty, but I am not

sure that it does not avenge itself in the end. There is at least one lesson to be learned from Aristotle to which McTaggart seems always to have been blind, the lesson that τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται. A philosopher with the "equivocity" of Being before his mind would, I suspect, have been much less readily satisfied by the arguments which McTaggart finds sufficient to warrant him in excluding God from his scheme of things. I hasten to say that from the point of view of metaphysics it seems to me a real service to philosophy that McTaggart should have been so uncompromising in his "atheism." If he decides that there is really no God, his conclusion is very largely due to the intellectual honesty which will not let him compromise with religious convention by transferring the *name* God to the universe. Selfhood and "transcendence" are rightly recognized as indispensable to the being who is to be the object of adoration; in this respect, McTaggart shows a much profounder sense of the exigences of religion than many metaphysicians whose language, on the face of it, seems much more theological, or even Christian, than his own. It is all to the good, also, that the case for the possibility of a spiritual interpretation of the world without recognition of God as its Creator, or even its ruler, should be argued with the directness and clearness with which it is presented by McTaggart; only when the atheist's case has been stated in the strongest possible way is it possible to feel very much confidence in the force of the theist's *sed contra*. In other respects, it is noteworthy that McTaggart is able to put forward a vigorous defence of characteristically Christian conceptions which are often treated with much less respect by "idealists" whose language about Deity is more conventional. Thus he makes a powerful rejoinder to the too common depreciation of the Christian conception of "eternal life" as something to be anticipated in the future, as contrasted with something present "here and now," and will have nothing of the Spinozistic defence of the world as we find it as something altogether good and perfect. The pluralism involved by his doctrine that "selves" are "fundamental differentiations of the Absolute" allows him to give full recognition to the actuality of evil, and though he feels compelled, like most "absolute idealists," to regard time as an illusion and therefore to hold that, in strict metaphysical accuracy, there is neither past nor future, he feels free to insist on the point that the illusion has a real foundation; it is the distorted perception of a series which is real, though not really temporal. The series, it is held, has a last term, and it is only when the selves have reached the last term that the series is seen as it really and "eternally" is. So long, then, as we are not in "Heaven," Heaven rightly is taken to be some-

thing which lies ahead of us in the future and is not "now here." The ordinary Christian has been right in his conception, or as nearly right as it is possible to be "in our present experience," and the Spinozistic critic of him has been wrong, though the ordinary Christian has not known how to provide the reasons which prove him to be in the right. Even the conventional doctrine which most arouses McTaggart's hostility, that of Hell, receives a relative justification which might possibly have satisfied Gregory Nyssen. It is true that "Heaven" is the final destination of all selves, but on the way there, we may yet have to encounter evil as grievous as the worst known to us from the history of the past, and conceivably worse to an unknown degree. There is here the possibility of something which, if not an "eternal Hell," is a Purgatory of an appalling grimness, and a grimness not relieved by any certain vision of the Heaven which is to follow. It is explicitly maintained that there is no guarantee that in the long interval between death and entrance on "the final stage"—it is presumably exceedingly long, because McTaggart holds himself to have proved that all selves reach the "final stage" together, none entering "Heaven" so long as any remain outside—I may repeatedly not only suffer more than the worst human cruelty has ever inflicted, but commit crimes graver than any recorded in history. There could not be any too much "contentment" in this "fire."

Naturally, it is impossible here to offer elaborate criticism of such a detailed theory of the whole universe, and the impossibility is made all the greater by the fact that the foundations of the whole system were laid in Vol. I., and are simply presupposed in the continuation now before us. Strictly speaking, in the present volume we are dealing only with probable conclusions drawn from empirical premisses. Our results therefore do not admit of absolute demonstration, except on one point. In the first volume, it is claimed, it was rigorously demonstrated, without any appeal to "facts," that the universe must be a whole made up of "primary parts" which contain parts and parts within themselves *ad infinitum*, the terms of this unending series being connected among themselves by the highly complicated relation called by the author "determining correspondence." Vol. II. opens with an attempt to establish a further position of absolute importance, also taken to be capable of demonstration, the unreality of time. Time is pronounced unreal on the strength of an elaborate argument which deserves a minute examination such as cannot be given here, that it contains an internal contradiction. It is not merely a series of successive "moments" related as earlier and later; it is also part of its inmost nature that it is made of moments, each of which is

successively future, present, and past. (This, at least, is a consideration obviously true and of profound significance.) The contradiction comes in when we consider that the moment *A*, if before *B* at all, is "eternally" before *B*, and yet *A* must be a "present moment" at one time; *B* must be the "present" at another. If this contradiction is insoluble, it follows that temporal succession is a misapprehended appearance of a relation which is really non-temporal. This gives us our immediate point of departure for our further enquiry into the special character of the "primary parts" and their subordinate parts which, according to vol. i., constitute the universe. It is then argued that, given the results of vol. i. and the unreality of time, the only things known to us which satisfy the conditions of "determining correspondence" are conscious (not necessarily self-conscious) selves and their perceptions. "Primary parts," then, are all selves, and the only parts of these parts which can stand in the relation of "determining correspondence" are direct perceptions. It follows from this that there are really no such things as "matter," "sensa," or "images," since none of them are selves or perceptions. Similarly, if the only activity of selves is perception, it follows that all perception is perception by a self of a self (its own or another), or of the perception of a self. (Every perception is thus a perception of the form: I perceive that *A*—who may of course be the same as "I"—perceives that *B* perceives that *C* perceives . . . *ad infin.*) All other apparent mental acts such as judging, wishing, supposing, imagining, must be really perceptions mistaken for something else, and much ingenuity is expended in the attempt to show how the mistake must inevitably arise from the supreme initial misapprehension, the apparent perception of time. It is then argued, ably but to my mind not convincingly, that direct perception of a self is always attended by love for the self perceived, or, when percipient and perceived are the same self, by the very similar attitude of self-reverence; for selves indirectly perceived—as when I only perceive *C* by perceiving *B* as perceiving *C*—there is affection; towards the perception which are parts of these "selves" there is acquiescence. These are the premisses for the final conclusion that in the "final stage," when the illusion of time has disappeared, and with it the consequent illusion that there is anything but selves and their perceptions, all selves are united by intense love and affection; there are no ungratified volitions, since there are no volitions other than "acquiescences" in the perceived, and no evil, except the minor evil of "sympathetic pain" in the awareness of the evils attendant on the now vanished "pre-final stages." (These are "perceived," but not properly

speaking "remembered," since experience no longer wears the illusory aspect of temporality. Cf. the language of Folco in Dante's *Paradiso* about his own disorderly youth.) There is much more of profound interest in the working out of the theory—in particular, the attempted identification of the reality which masquerades as the time-series with a series of "perceptions" connected by the logical relation of inclusion—into which space forbids us to enter.

It is obvious that the whole scheme depends in the first place on the theory of the ground-pattern of the universe laid down in Vol. I. McTaggart does not accept the Leibnizian view that there is a range of real possibilities wider than the actual; yet in effect what he has done in Vol. I. is to present us with the pattern of "any possible world." If there should be no such relation as "determining correspondence," if any of the five conditions demanded for it in Vol. I. should be unmeaning or self-contradictory, or if they should not all be mutually compatible, the main argument for the conclusion that nothing is real but selves and their perceptions will fall to the ground. It is impossible here to enter on a detailed examination of "determining correspondence," but I may at least hint that *prima facie* the conditions demanded for it do not seem obviously capable of fulfilment. For the sake of brevity, I will only mention one difficulty which impresses me. It is avowed by McTaggart himself that it is a condition that there should be a "sufficient description" of every term which enters into an infinite "determining correspondence series," that is, a description which, from the nature of the case, can apply only to that one term and to no other. Now, I submit that such unique description is only possible if we can first start with a term such that its existence and unicity are self-evidently undeniable, and then indicate, for any other term, a manifestly unique relation in which it stands to this initial term. In other words, one needs to begin by accepting the "ontological argument" for the existence of God, together with a further theology. (If, for example, one started by accepting orthodox Christian theology, there would be such a unique description of Jesus Christ as "*the* man uniquely related, in virtue of the hypostatic union, to Deity," and we, on our planet, could then make dating by the "era of our Lord" a means to the sufficient description of other terms.) But it would be false to McTaggart's philosophy, as expounded by himself, to admit an "ontological proof" of the existence of anything. Hence "sufficient description" seems to me only possible on terms he would have repudiated. But if, for this or any other reason, "determining correspondence" cannot be presumed to be the ground-plan

of the universe, the arguments used to prove that nothing but a self can be a "primary part" of the universe, and that nothing but a perception can be a "part" of a self, collapse. For they all turn on the contention that nothing known to us except selves and their perceptions can enter into a series of which "determining correspondence" is the generating relation.

The other principal premiss for the deductions of vol. ii. seems to me equally open to question—the denial of the reality of time. It is a great service to the cause of clear philosophical thinking to have insisted upon the problem of time as the great *crux* for a cosmology, and on the impossibility of explaining temporality as a mere relation of earlier and later between events, without any reference to the distinction between past, present, and future. I should myself wholly agree with McTaggart that in our actual experience of time, these last distinctions, which constitute what he calls the *A*-series, are far more important than the others; indeed, I should be prepared to say that the mere *schema* of succession which figures in our dynamical formulæ as the "time-variable," is not genuine time at all; genuine time, I should say, is only to be found where there are individual subjects of experiences with individual biographies of their own; it is the *schema* not of succession, but of moral action. If the physical world were not the scene of what I may call the personal adventures of agents, time would not be a feature of it. But I must own myself unconvinced by McTaggart's ingenious attempts to show that time involves a contradiction and must therefore be only "apparent." The contradiction seems to me only to arise when you assume, as I think McTaggart does, that if today's occupations, which were in the future yesterday, are now present and will tomorrow be past, there must be a time of the second order within which "today" successively occupies different positions. If you once make this assumption, it is easy to show that you are committed to a vicious regress *in infinitum*; but need the assumption be made? If it need not, there is no reason to pronounce change and time illusions. Indeed, I do not see how they can be illusions unless virtue and vice and the whole moral order are to be illusions too, as McTaggart insists that they are not. It is a hard problem, the hardest, I think, in the whole of philosophy, to find room for the eternal and the temporal in one metaphysical scheme, but I cannot believe that the true solution can lie in pronouncing either temporality or eternity an illusion. And if it is to be temporality which is declared to be the illusion, I doubt whether rigid consistency will permit the ultimate plurality of subjects of experience, on which McTaggart always insisted so vehemently, to be regarded as more than illusory.

Spinozistic monism, I confess, does much less justice to the content of experience than a pluralism like McTaggart's or Leibniz's, but it seems much the more natural type of metaphysic for one who denies the reality of time. Nor am I sure that McTaggart himself ever succeeds in being wholly true to his own conclusions. When the reality which is "misperceived" as the temporal series of events is said to be a series of terms in which each later member is logically inclusive of all its precursors, and the "last term" of the temporal order, the "Heaven" to which we are all going, to be really last only in the sense that it includes all the others and is included by none, the description seems to me to get all its plausibility from an unconscious retention in imagination of the temporal order which is taken to be "explained." To put the same point rather differently, when all is said, "absolute reality" and "our present experience" seem all through to be set over against one another in unreconciled contradiction. If time were not pronounced unreal, the contradiction would no longer be absolute; it would become the contrast between things as we really see them now, and things as we hope yet to see them.

Long as this notice is, there is yet one further point I must add, with reference to the attempted disproof of theism, and in particular of a theism involving the notion of creation. McTaggart makes much of two main difficulties. God—if there is a God—it is urged must be part of the "universe," or sum of all that is, and this conception gives rise to insoluble difficulties. And, in particular, God cannot be a Creator, because creation involves reference to time, and there really is no time. An intelligent antagonist, supporting the traditional orthodoxy of Christian theology, would meet the first contention at once by denying the univocity of "being." If being, when asserted of God and the creatures, is not a *vox univoca*, and similarly if none of the categories can be applied to God, McTaggart's rendering becomes invalid; God will not be a "part" of the universe, nor yet will God and the universe be parts of some still more inclusive whole, any more than Shakespeare and the mirth of Falstaff. And reflection shows, I think, that what McTaggart means by the other puzzle is that if the world had been created, there must have been a *time* when the world did not exist. (His actual words are "that something should be caused to exist which did not exist before," but the context seems to demand the interpretation I have given; if the words are taken in any other sense, there appears to be no argument.) Does any philosopher who believes in creation hold that there ever was time previous to creation?

A. E. TAYLOR.

WHAT I BELIEVE: RELIGION WITHOUT REVELATION. By Julian Huxley. Benn. 8s. 6d.

This book should have been reviewed long ago, and the penitent reviewer can only plead that he has begun more than once to record his impressions of the work, but time and again has been held back by the doubt whether he has really understood what the writer means. That doubt has not been completely exorcised even now, but something must be said, for the book is too interesting and too important to be passed over in silence.

Mr. Huxley's book is one of three written from different points of view under the general title *What I Believe*. Without disrespect to Father Knox and Miss Royden, it may be said that Mr. Huxley is far happier in his task than his fellow or rival authors. Probably few Roman Catholics would have chosen Mr. Knox as the ideal protagonist of their cause, and still fewer Anglicans would have thought of Miss Royden, but Mr. Huxley is almost an ideal representative of the modern religious mind which is in revolt against Christianity. He represents it in its idealism, its intellectual ardour, and in its vagueness. One of the most impressive characteristics of Mr. Huxley's book is the profound conviction of the vital importance of religion which breathes through his pages. He sees that civilization needs a religion, and he thinks that the religion of the Christian Churches cannot supply that need. "There must be," he writes, "a great many who are profoundly dissatisfied with the present state of affairs, in which the spiritual values of religion are in large part still in the possession of the organized Churches, while these same Churches have lost all claim to the intellectual values. The head and the heart of civilization are being torn in different directions." No one who reads this book can doubt that Mr. Huxley is a profoundly religious man, and we can imagine no more salutary discipline for the Christian teacher and preacher than to read his book. He includes a chapter on his own spiritual development which is a document of the first importance for the study of the religious condition of the modern man.

As the title of the book indicates, Mr. Huxley does not believe in revelation. But it is not easy to see precisely what he understands revelation to mean. It may be suspected that he has in mind that conception of revelation which regarded it as the imparting of information about God, guaranteed by "external evidence" such as miracles. Very few enlightened Christian theologians would give this account of the nature of revelation. Modern theology has almost universally accepted in some form or other the idea that revelation is the disclosure of God in human experience. An attentive reading of Mr.

Huxley's book shows that, in this sense, he does not reject revelation, but rather that his own religion is, so to speak, exceptionally revelational. As compared with St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, Mr. Huxley's religion is not based on rational principles but entirely upon human experience of the values of the universe. So far from his religion being a "religion without revelation," it is a religion which depends wholly on the disclosure of the values in the universe in the experience of men. In religion at least Mr. Huxley is an extreme anti-intellectualist. He seems to suppose that men's feelings and emotions have very little connection with their ideas, and we find him cataloguing the experience of sin and forgiveness among those elements of human life which will persist, doubtless in a purified form, when the idea of God has been banished. We may agree that some distresses of mind will still remain even when Mr. Huxley's religion is the universal creed, and perhaps the psychologists may be able to bring relief, but it may be questioned whether anything which could be called a sense of sin or an experience of forgiveness can persist when there is no longer the thought of a God who has been offended and can forgive.

For the chief feature of Mr. Huxley's religion is not that it is a religion without revelation but a religion without God. The author does not attempt to conceal the fact that in his opinion the idea of God is an incubus upon the religious spirit. He would expunge the last remnants of anthropomorphism and cannot conceal his contempt for those who still believe in a personal deity. This essence of religion consists in the feeling of reverence. The religious man is one who is filled with reverence. When we ask, Reverence for what? it must be admitted that the answer is not easy to find. It is not certainly reverence for the universe, because in Mr. Huxley's view the universe is not as a whole spiritual, nor, as we gather, even friendly to human ideals. The emotion of reverence is called forth by "an apprehension of the sacredness in existence." It is very easy to caricature a view which one does not hold, but the present writer must confess that an honest effort to imagine the kind of life proposed to one who was willing to take Mr. Huxley as a practical guide to religion has failed to produce anything but an image of a man seeking to get as many thrills of the "apprehension of sacredness" as possible. It need hardly be said that Professor Otto's Idea of the Holy is pressed into the service of this as of all other emotional theories of religion.

But Mr. Huxley is not without a theology. He is the nearest approach to a disciple which Mr. Wells has yet obtained, though

it is to be feared that God the invisible King has now become invisible even to Mr. Wells. There is some sectarian quarrel between Mr. Huxley and Mr. Wells concerning the adequacy of the name "the Veiled Being," but in essentials there is little difference. For Mr. Huxley the ultimate basis of existence is inscrutably aloof from human hope and values. The "religion without revelation" has the Trinity no less than the religion of the invisible King. The Spirit corresponds to that "direction" in evolution which Mr. Huxley seems to discern, while humanity with its values and ideals is represented as in some way an incarnation of Spirit. It is difficult to understand how a mind so acute as Mr. Huxley's can fail to see the enormous problems which his view raises in any reflective mind. We will mention only one. How can these three principles form a unity? And if they do not, how is the fundamental assumption of science itself—the unity of the universe—to be saved? We have to be content with a dogmatic assertion that the unity is there without any suggestion of how it can be conceived. We might suggest to Mr. Huxley that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity has at least the merit of having seen the real problem.

With all his gifts of sincerity and learning, Mr. Huxley has not produced the outline of a religion which will be a serious rival to Christianity. It fails of course as a practical programme, but that is not its chief defect. It fails because it lacks coherence. It is a bundle of brilliant suggestions which when examined refuse to come together into a systematic unity. Compared with it the traditional theology of the Church is severely rational.

We have one or two complaints to make of Mr. Huxley's detailed exposition. It is regrettable that he should have given some very hasty and imperfect indications of the positions of various schools of theological thought. No one could reasonably expect him to be an expert theologian, but he ought to realize that a most unjust impression is given to readers who have no first-hand knowledge by swift generalization on extreme representatives of a particular view. It may sound presumptuous to challenge Mr. Huxley on a point connected with evolution, but the summary remarks which he makes on the futility of restating the Teleological Argument on the basis of modern views of evolution almost compel us to do so. Mr. Huxley has not, we believe, understood the real implications of "emergent evolution" as held, for example, by Professor Lloyd Morgan. It is maintained that "emergent evolution," if thought out, will lead us to a teleological conception of the process of evolution. Mr. Huxley disagrees; but it would have been fairer to his readers to explain how far he accepts "emergent

evolution" and what he understands by it, and to have considered the arguments based upon it. He must guard against the oracular style.

It must be said again that this is, if not a good book, one which deserves to be read as a sign of the times and a symptom of the spiritual situation. Only a very weak-minded Christian could find his faith disturbed. An intelligent Christian will lay down the book with the conviction that Christianity will win because of its superior rationality, and that the chief cause of its delayed triumph is the intellectual indolence of Christians.

W. R. MATTHEWS.

AND WAS MADE MAN. An introduction to the study of the Gospels. By Leonard Hodgson. Longmans. 9s.

The author of this book remarks, in reference to its sub-title, that it "contains little or nothing of the material usually comprised under such a heading." It is not occupied with the usual questions of literary criticism, but with *prolegomena* of a more theological and philosophical kind. The author was led to feel the necessity for some such work by his experience as a teacher of theology at Oxford. Others who have tried to teach theology will agree with him as to the importance of guiding young students into a right philosophical approach to the subject-matter of the Gospels. For such a purpose Professor Hodgson's book has high value. It is a product of reverent faith and discriminating judgment, and it is characterized throughout by candour and sincerity which win the reader's sympathy, even where he may feel inclined to register disagreement.

The author is not primarily concerned with the theology of the Incarnation, but rather with the Gospels themselves as the touchstone of Christological theory. He believes that the Gospels offer us neither an Apollinarian nor a humanitarian Christ, but rather a divine Person made Man, whose deity is to be approached through a mind and character which were in the fullest degree human. The teaching of our Lord does not lose its authority when its human conditions and limitations are frankly recognized. The general characteristics of these human conditions are considered in some detail. Of special value are the chapters on "Eschatology" and "Rewards and Punishments." In the former it is shown that a certain kind of traditional dualism in interpreting Christ's teaching and claims may be discarded, because normal human channels can be seen to provide the adequate medium of His thought about Himself in relation to the purpose of God in the universe. The source of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement is found in our

Lord's teaching concerning rewards and punishments, forgiveness, and His own mission to give His life a ransom for many. The Abelardian theory of the Atonement is subjected to some very shrewd criticism, and a more adequate approach to that doctrine is made through an analysis of human punishment and social ethics. We look forward to the fuller treatment of this subject which Professor Hodgson hopes to complete. Perhaps he will consider the suggestion that the Atonement needs to be brought into relation not only to social institutions and ethical considerations, but also to the history of ritual cultus and to the sacrificial aspect of religion.

The rest of the book consists of three chapters, dealing with "Miracles," "Outlines of the Life," and "The Fourth Gospel." The approach to each of these subjects is sought, as in earlier chapters, in the human conditions of the Incarnation. As in His earthly life our Lord "was limited to such knowledge as was open to a human mind," so we must "think of the powers exercised by Christ as being powers open to manhood where manhood is found in its perfection." "The miracles of Christ are worked through 'faith.' That 'faith' was born of knowledge that certain things were necessary for Him to fulfil His mission." The author rightly refuses to accept a familiar modern distinction between "healing miracles" and "nature miracles," of which the former alone are accounted credible. The first temptation, for example, shows that our Lord associated miraculous power over nature with His "messianic" mission. The whole point of the temptation depends upon this fact. But the messianic works must be in accord with God's purpose for the Messiah. The tentative outlines of our Lord's life which follow are broadly those of St. Mark's Gospel. Mr. Hodgson finds reasons for accepting this order in the evidences of "the mind of Christ" set forth in previous chapters. Approaching St. John's Gospel from these conclusions he gives reasons for believing that the Johannine portrait of Christ is "overwhelmingly human." He concludes that this Gospel gives "the inside of the synoptic portrait" or the facts as they appeared to our Lord's own mind. The synoptists show Him as He was known to His contemporaries; the Fourth Gospel gives Him as He revealed Himself to His most intimate friend.

There remains one section of the book which stands somewhat apart from the main argument—namely, the discussion of the Virgin-Birth and the Resurrection. The few pages devoted to these important subjects seem to suffer seriously from undue compression. They are not related to the main plan of the book, they bristle with disputable statements, and they provoke a number of questions to which no answer is

attempted. In the four pages devoted to the "spiritual body" there appears to be real confusion of thought. The writer seems to argue that a spiritual body cannot be in any sense material. St. Paul, who invented the phrase, can scarcely have meant this. Whatever his complex terminology may be supposed to teach, it certainly cannot be simply equated with the modern post-Cartesian antithesis of matter and spirit. Moreover, on the very next page Mr. Hodgson tells us that all theories about the risen body are disqualified by our complete ignorance as to the facts upon which a judgment might be based. If so, then how can he argue that those who believe in a spiritual body "must use the word 'body' in the latter phrase to denote a spiritual, not a material, reality"? There seems to be no adequate reason for accepting the dilemma. The rapid transformations which are taking place both in physics and in the philosophy of nature do not justify Mr. Hodgson's somewhat dogmatic agnosticism on these matters. The subject needs to be placed upon a much larger stage than is allowed to it in this book. There is in the New Testament literature an expectation, by no means negligible, which looks for a redemption of the material creation through a transformation of the present physical order. For Christian theists this is a rational expectation, perhaps even a necessary one. If we set aside the lumber of obsolete prejudices, there is nothing in our present knowledge of the universe which can be supposed to conflict with this expectation. Mr. Hodgson has confined himself to one particular way of approach to the gospels, "the lines along which I have come to find the character of our Lord stand out and grow in richness of content as it was revealed in the days of His flesh." Along these lines his guidance is most welcome. But there are other aspects of the Incarnation, which necessarily fall outside his plan, but which have an important bearing upon the two great miracles of the Birth and the Resurrection. For this reason it seems a pity that these subjects were included in the book, notwithstanding the courageous and welcome confession of personal faith with which this section closes (p. 131).

Here and there the author employs language characteristic of the "kenotic" theories. It is to be hoped that many will welcome his treatment of our Lord's true manhood; but some of us will find it difficult to attach any meaning to the statement that "during His life on earth He laid aside His divine attributes" (p. 213). The truth implied could surely be stated in a less crudely mythological way. But, details apart, the Epilogue in which Professor Hodgson sums up his argument goes far to disarm all criticism. This book deserves to be widely read.

L. S. THORNTON, C.R.

NOTICES

ARCHBISHOP HERRING'S VISITATION RETURNS, 1743. Vol. I. Edited by S. L. Ollard, M.A., Rector of Bainton, and P. C. Walker, M.A., Rector of Lockington. Printed for Yorkshire Archæological Society, 1928.

Many acknowledgments are needed if justice is to be done to an admirable enterprise which thus comes to us in its first instalment. There is the Archbishop in whose care are the originals at Bishopthorpe. There is the producing society, which counts nothing more valuable among its seventy valuable volumes of printed records, and which is well entitled to public support in respect not only of this instalment but of those which are to follow; for while 215 parishes are dealt with here, 621 parishes remain to be similarly recorded. Above all there are the two editors, Mr. Walker, who has undertaken the long and rather monotonous labour of transcription, producing some useful tabulations of the results, and Canon Ollard, who has checked every line with him and contributes a characteristic and well-informed preface.

Herring's questions at his Visitation of the Diocese of York in 1743 contained nothing of an unusual type. Wake and Gibson had devised the norm, and the new Archbishop was content to follow it. The limitation of the subjects upon which Visitation questions were legitimate does not prevent the record from overstepping it just now and again. Such an overstepping appears in the note appended to the report on Armley Chapel (p. 11): "The Church Wardens ordered to provide a Parchment Book for Registers"; and, still more, in what is said about Acklam, West (p. 31): "Church Wardens *presented* for having no Parchment Register." The very rareness of it shows that the registers did not come within any visitatorial purview or presentment, and legislation is still needed to bring them beyond doubt under diocesan supervision.

But this welcome volume has a personal and a historical interest of the first order. Think of 1743, two years before "the '45." It is a period during which the meaner sort of scribbler makes you think the worst of the means by which man rose to high station in the Church. Thomas Herring was confirmed as Archbishop of York on April 21, 1743. This notice is being written among the mountains away from books; but in a few days, if memory serves, Horace Walpole, with the knowledge that good Bishop Hough had at long last passed to his rest, was watching expectant prelates leave their cards on the Prime Minister, then newly come to live near him in Arlington Street. In a few days more Walpole could write to Sir Horace Mann the result of these calls: "Madox, of St. Asaph, has wriggled himself into the see of Worcester. He makes haste."

But Herring somehow made an impress on the appreciation of such small chroniclers. Edmund Pyle and Kerrich were of course drawn to him by the double ties of East Anglia and Corpus Christi College. When the vacancy at York was being filled Pyle, as it happened, was staying with Hoadly at Chelsea, and was on duty at Court. Kerrich would want to know all about it, and Pyle writes to him from "St. James's April 4, 1743":

I am just going upstairs to see your old friend the Bishop of Bangor kiss the King's hand for the archbishopric of York, which prize in the lottery of the church has, as everything has done, fallen into his lap—He has, against all rules of gravity, and experience, risen by the weight of his character.*

It was just this weight of character which made him send out a solid unemotional letter to his clergy ten days after the temporalities of the see of York were restored to him, asking for "Assistance in the Administration of it," and for their answers to his questions. The answers are what Canon Ollard and Mr. Parker give us the chance to read. They reveal a set of clergymen, serious in their work; more frequently "resident" than we should expect; glad to be able to say how large a proportion of their people were communicants last Easter, and how few of them were Romans or Quakers or Methodists; thankful that the Archbishop would confirm at certain centres during the Visitation, and making ready to present to him the candidates who were of age to be confirmed.

Indeed, Confirmation was thus tacked on to Visitations for some while after this, and it was Warburton, who made up his mind that the practice gave the candidates little chance of benefit, and who therefore decided to devote the unoccupied days of the period of Visitation to confirming the young people as a separate function. Herring, as we know, atoned for Blackburne's gross neglect by confirming 30,000 persons at this one season, bringing up Mawson, Master of his college and Bishop of Chichester, to help him in the task. You can find out from Pyle what he professes that Mawson said about this work. But Pyle was a mean scribbler, and the Church of that age was better-equipped and of a finer spirit than its mean scribblers allow.

ERNEST WORCESTER.

CHRIST AND SOCIETY. By Charles Gore, D.D. Allen and Unwin. 4s. 6d.

Bishop Gore writes with all his accustomed fire and conviction in this valuable little book. It is by no means lacking in freshness and vigour, despite the fact that it restates positions adopted many years ago, and calls for reforms which have been urged for nearly half a century.

The freshness which marks Dr. Gore's writings is due to the skill with which he enforces familiar principles with new instances, and illustrates them from recent history. His candour prevents him from echoing party cries, and his detachment will not allow him to be led into the wholesale admiration of the Middle Ages which has become the fashion in certain circles; indeed, his chapter on "The Mediæval Church" is one of the best in the book and is a useful corrective to the rather uncritical "Chesterton-Belloc" attitude.

The last lecture on "Practical Measures" provokes rather mixed feelings. It is good to know that there is so much goodwill and so many groups of earnest men and women keenly interested in the work of social reconstruction, but it is disappointing to be told that "these associations seem in danger of coming to a standstill." Bishop Gore looks for a "special association for Christian Social propaganda." This is essential

* A. Hartshorne, *Memoirs of a Royal Chaplain*, p. 74.

if the impact upon society is to be at all proportionate to the urgency of the cause, or the numbers of those engaged in it. At the same time, Dr. Gore's plea for "a strengthening of our intellectual basis" should not go unheeded. There has been a good deal of uninformed sentiment in the past, and perhaps now the movement for social righteousness has passed the rhetorical stage and is in need of a more scientific, if less sensational, period. Assuredly it will not lack enthusiasm while we have prophets like Dr. Gore amongst us.

M. DONOVAN.

A LITURGICAL STUDY OF THE PSALTER. By C. C. Keet, Ph.D. Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

This is a book to read with grateful appreciation, to set the reader's imagination at work picturing the services in Temple and synagogue, and his fingers turning the pages of his Psalter. It is learned, as befits a thesis submitted, and successfully, for the degree of Ph.D. at London University; it shows extensive study of original sources, and of those contributions to understanding of the Psalms which are a feature of present-day research. But it is also a clear and lucid presentation that can be appreciated by the unlearned reader who loves the Psalms and welcomes every help to further understanding of them. The interesting theories of Mowinckel are fully treated; there is a valuable description of Temple music; and the commentary on Psalm cxviii. is happy and suggestive. The book deserves the commendation which Canon Box gives in the introduction, that it is "fresh, stimulating, and illuminating."

Yet with a hope of favours to come we would indicate some points on which we hope Dr. Keet will change his opinions. The ordinary Christian reads the Psalms for their direct devotional meaning. He can add fresh value to them if he turns to their original literal meaning, and imagines them being used by Jewish worshippers. But what worshippers? at what stage of Jewish life and history? Dr. Keet says, after the Exile, in the later stage of the Restoration, and onward. He says "With pre-Exilic worship this essay is not directly concerned"; and he asserts that "in early pre-Exile times worship assumed a form which it would be difficult to dignify with the title liturgical." If it were possible, it would be of great interest to imagine ourselves taking part in the worship of, feeling the pulse of, repeating the words of, Israel in the heroic days before the Exile. We see no reason to admit that this is not possible. It is true that after the Exile there was a great development of liturgical worship. The Jew had learned new music; had reached new thought; he wanted a "new song." The wider national interests of the days of independence had disappeared; men's thoughts were focussed on religion; Israel had become almost a congregation of professional worshippers. The great pilgrimages would foster this. With such congregations, leaders of worship could develop much more elaborate processions, music, and ritual. Worship was developed, but not out of recognition. The "back to David" movement, obvious in their thought, would keep them wishing to feel that they were worshipping on the same liturgical plan as their fathers; psalmody remained to them psalmody of David. Dr. Keet retains the idea that a psalm was a hymn to be sung at some point of a service. But we hope he will follow Dr. Peters in his fascinating suggestions that the psalms are liturgies, themselves orders of service. They are not hymns,

but they are full of hymns—odes, anthems, litanies, marching-songs, praise-songs, each for its own stage of the service. When cxviii. speaks of entering the gates, the author of the psalm is not imagining himself doing so; he actually was doing so; and verses 19-20 are the dramatic summons and reply used at that moment. The psalm shows the processional path that the congregation followed; and David, Hezekiah, and Nehemiah had used that path before him. While a historic and well-loved liturgy might be adapted for its later occasions, there is no compulsion to believe that a congregation with a historic instinct like the Jews would completely sever itself from the old worship.

STACY WADDY.

ST. PAUL AND PAGANISM. By Thomas Wilson, B.D. T. and T. Clark.
10s.

Few problems in "Christian Origins" are more important and more fascinating than the question of the relationship of the faith to the pagan environment in which it developed. It is with this subject that Mr. Wilson's book deals, most industriously but not always lucidly or convincingly. St. Paul, as a human being, must have been influenced by the environment in which he grew up, and that environment included not only Judaism but what may be called, after Reitzenstein, "Hellenistic Theology." These two points may be granted at once. But inferences based on them with regard to the origin of St. Paul's own theological ideas need a more careful scrutiny than Mr. Wilson gives them. He regards the two points as justifying a whole series of "must have beens"; and attaches significance to circumstances as trivial as St. Paul's use of the epistolary methods usual among the pagans of his day. "The pagan belief in heroes" is brought forward as a partial explanation of St. Paul's readiness to accept Jesus Christ as divine; "the symbolic representation of the death of Sandace" (enacted in Tarsus) "no doubt prepared the mind of the young St. Paul for the acceptance of faith in the Christ who died, rose again, and was exalted as the Risen Lord"; and so forth. The author has collected his data with the most exemplary diligence, but is sadly deficient in the critical faculty of relating them convincingly to his conclusions. The same defect is noticeable in other connections throughout the book—e.g., he identifies the Risen Christ and the Holy Spirit in St. Paul's theology repeatedly and positively without a hint that there is any other tenable view; and in his discussion of the Sacraments there is not a word about Dominical institution or Jewish antecedents. The vital distinctions between what is superficial and what is significant, between *post hoc* and *propter hoc*, between similarity in minor points and evident influence, are seldom taken into account; and these failures make Dr. Wilson, for all his learning, a very unsafe guide in so intricate a subject. Half an hour spent in a careful reading of Mr. Bevan's fourth article in *Hellenism and Christianity* (on "the First Contact of Christianity and Paganism") would afford far more illumination and far surer evidence than a perusal of this book. But we must end with a word of gratitude for the prophetic enthusiasm of Mr. Wilson's last chapter, and a sincere commendation of his treatment of "Religion, Morality, Salvation" in Chapter VI.

E. GRAHAM.

LION-MAN. By A. S. Cripps. Sheldon Press. 3s. 6d. net.

It is safe to predict that this very unusual story will be read by many with frank scepticism; by others with the absorbed fascination which a well-written, uncanny story merits. It tells of an elderly English scholar whose life-study has been Animistic religions, and who goes to an out-of-the-way part of Rhodesia in order to get material for a book he is writing. There he finds that not only the natives but his trader brother-in-law and a fine type of Christian missionary are all agreed that by means of magic a witch-doctor is transforming several natives into "were-lions"; that is, they revert to the wild and hunt in packs, revelling in feasts which are not pretty. To break the power of the witch-doctor the missionary proposes a test: the Europeans shall eat of the supposed magic pumpkin before the fear-filled natives, and so demonstrate its harmlessness. With the exception of the scientist, who is an agnostic, the Europeans seek the help of God by prayer, feeling themselves arrayed against the dark forces of African magic. Nothing happens to any of them, save the scientist. That night he, too, reverts to pre-human conditions, and runs with the "lion-pack." With extraordinary skill, Mr. Cripps dissects the mental processes of the man, whose mind has not reverted as completely as his lower nature. His cherished agnosticism forbids him to believe in magic or demon-possession; he argues that it is either some form of dementia or a poison which has invaded his personality. But gradually he comes to feel that the only way of escape for him is the way of Nebuchadnezzar, to humble himself before God. In a brief, beautifully written chapter he regains sanity on Easter Morning as he kneels before the Altar in the little Mission Church.

To the sceptic who would impatiently brush the story aside as impossible, it is worth pointing out that Mr. Cripps has dealt with a very widely held belief among African natives. Many millions believe that witch-doctors have the power to assume the form of beasts of prey, and it is unlikely that so widespread a belief has no basis in fact. If the author has based his story upon some incident known to him, a note to that effect in subsequent editions would add greatly to the interest of a weird, gripping story. If it is wholly imaginary, one can only say of it that it is a wonderful piece of imaginary writing.

ARTHUR E. SOUTON.

CREATIVE PERSONALITY AND EVOLUTION. Sermons by Stewart A. McDowall, B.D. S.P.C.K. London. 5s.

These sermons are good examples of the work of the Scholar in the Pulpit, for in them thoughtful philosophy is made the substance of impressive preaching. They are not every man's portion, but they should find many readers among those who seek "the present truth."

The author here defends and applies the leading conceptions of his Hulsean Lectures, *Evolution, Knowledge and Reality*, and, especially in the Introduction and the very important chapter on Personality, is at work upon further development of his system of ideas. There is much that is fresh in this able volume, and it should find a place among the books of all those who wish to keep pace with contemporary enquiries regarding ultimate truth. S.P.C.K. issues some very important theological works included in its current lists, and this is not one of the least. The problems with which Mr. McDowall deals are among the most pressing for present-

day thought. His own independent conclusions are in line with Gentile's "actual idealism," though the original elements wherein he differs from the neo-idealists are important and include some conceptions which Christian Theism must always affirm.

It is difficult to avoid the impression that there are two strands in Mr. McDowall's thought and some conceptions which are imperfectly unified. How far does he hold the formula "Being substantiated in Becoming" to apply? It is impossible to give the formula an unrestricted range, and at the same time to affirm that the kenosis which Becoming implies both in Creation and in Redemption does not affect "the Transcendent aspect of God." Mr. McDowall himself withdraws Being from this relation with Becoming when he affirms that as man draws nearer to perfection he, too, shall eventually enter into "the category of the Timeless or eternal." Gentile certainly fails to bring out the place of the past as part of the subject's present experience, the scope of historical objectivity, and it is by no means certain that Mr. McDowall's qualifications of Gentile suffice to give us a philosophy of the Perfect and Unlimited.

Nor do we escape from a static view of Reality by subjecting Being to the states of change and Becoming. The religious motives prompting affirmation of the "Isness" of Deity are paramount. Our need for and our recognition of a Guarantee of the attainment of spiritual worths and goals has precedence even over our need for sympathy. If, indeed, we are ever to hope to enter upon "perfect freedom" that can only be because in Himself, in the totality of His Being, God is not like unto us, subject to variety, creatures of days and years. In these regards there is much to the point in Von Hügel's seventh chapter in the second volume of his *Essays and Addresses*. Mr. McDowall shows how inclusive Christian philosophy must ever be and how necessary for the maintenance of true religion, and he preaches wisdom "among the initiated."

F. W. BUTLER.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN FAITH. Being selections from the writings of the late Gaston Frommel. Translated from the French by J. Macartney Wilson, D.D. Edited with an Introduction by J. Vernon Bartlet, D.D. Student Christian Movement. 7s. 6d.

Gaston Frommel, who was Professor of Theology in the University of Geneva from 1894 until his death in 1906, is described by Dr. Bartlet as "the chief recent exponent of a genuinely psychological French tradition in religious and Christian philosophy, going back even to Pascal in the seventeenth century." The selections from his writings which are included in this volume are grouped under the headings *The Approach to Religion, Faith, and The Inner Life*; and the choice and the translation are both sound. The book has value for all who are concerned with the attempt to understand the workings of the conscience. It should prove of special interest to any who would seek to know the mind of a man who "made a close study of Anglo-Catholicism," and found it wanting. "While appreciative of its devout spirit, and of the efforts of its more Liberal wing, as represented by *Lux Mundi*, to harmonize traditional theology with Biblical criticism and scientific evolution, he did not think its reconstruction went deep enough, or rooted itself directly enough in moral personality and individual experience."

Some criticism of Frommel's position as a psychologist is offered in the useful Introduction which Dr. Bartlet provides; and more might easily be added on the score of the limitation of the experience that is here analyzed. But the writer is concerned with the very core of Christian experience; he speaks from his heart, so that the chief impression left by the book is that of a sincere and very good man; and by his demonstration, first of the authority and power of the conscience generally, and then of the effect produced upon it by the presentation of the Figure of Christ, he provides a fine piece of Christian apologetic and a welcome reassurance of the finality of the Christian religion.

O. HARDMAN.

PAGANISM IN ROUMANIAN FOLKLORE. By Marcu Beza. J. M. Dent and Sons. 7s. 6d.

The persistence of pagan beliefs and practices in the rural districts of south-eastern Europe, and indeed to some extent in those of every other Christian land, raises some big general questions as to the exact relation between Christianity and civilization. But these survivals have an interest of their own, for the general reader as well as for the student of comparative folklore; and this well-produced volume, the work of the Consul-General for Roumania in London, is a welcome addition to the literature of the subject. The ten papers include an account of customs associated with Christmas, the New Year, and St. John's Eve; an investigation of rain-bringing ceremonies and of the hobby-horse dance; a collection of stories about the Creation, the Flood, and the Moon; a further collection of tales about the marriage of mortal men with nymphs and of divinities with human maidens; and a brief but suggestive comparison between Scottish and Roumanian ballad poetry.

O. HARDMAN.

BOOK NOTES

THE TREASURY OF THE FAITH. 7. *Divine Providence*. 8. *The Angels*. 10. *The Fall of Man*. 14. *Christ: Priest and Redeemer*. 17. *Actual Grace*. 33. *Eternal Punishment*. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 2s. each.

The first six volumes of this series have already been noticed in THEOLOGY. A further batch of six has now appeared. Subjects like Divine Providence and Actual Grace are not much studied by Anglicans at present, and the treatment of them here is largely non-controversial and in any case very useful. The volume on the Fall of Man starts with the decision of the Bible Commission in 1909 which pronounced that the first three chapters of Genesis are to be taken as literal and historical; that our first parents were endowed before the Fall with "justice, integrity, and immortality." Granted this start, the rest of the book is a logical working out of conclusions, to which exception cannot fairly be taken. Dr. Miller, the author of this volume, grants the difficulties, but says: "If we knew more of his (Adam's) life during the time preceding the fall . . . much that now puzzles us might become clear. Meanwhile we accept the fact on God's Authority."

Dr. Arundzen on Eternal Punishment is uncompromising. He describes the life of the damned thus: "Every instant of his never-ending

life he wants God and he knows he wants him, yet every instant he feels an irresistible recoil, a disgust, a loathing and a hatred, which turns him from that which he wants" (p. 12). Very valuable information is given by Jude v. 12—"clouds without water," etc. These words "are the word of God, and when God himself uses analogy and figure of speech, the study of God's metaphors is the most scientific treatment which the subject can bear" (p. 16). Hell-fire, as "a pain of sense," has not been infallibly defined, but no one can doubt it "without grievous sin" (p. 25). "The blessed in heaven do not rejoice in the pains of the damned as such, yet they do eternally rejoice that they are saved from so great an evil, and the very greatness of the evil avoided adds to the enjoyment of the happiness secured" (p. 85). *These are our spectacles*—have we quite escaped from the atmosphere of Tertullian?

In the book dealing with the Angels, all is not claimed as being *de fide*, but what is not is "the legitimate speculations of minds habitually attuned to revealed truth" (p. 1). This is just what many of our readers will doubt. In these able and sincere books there is much which seems to us a logical construction erected on a foundation not truly laid, because material has been used which the modern view of the Bible will not allow us to use. An extreme example occurs on p. 8 of this book, where the Angels are said to attend to the lowliest things on earth; the proof-text being Tobit ix., which tells us of Raphael's visit to Gabael on which he took from him the money owed to Tobit. It may even be suggested that the Petrine claims are a smaller difficulty to Anglicans than the state of mind that can gravely quote Jude's denunciation of heretics as God's authentic information about hell.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

The Man of Nazareth. By P. I. Painter. S.C.M. 5s. Lives of Our Lord are now being published with more frequency than ever before. Given a knowledge of the best recent books, an attractive style, a reverent attitude of mind, and a clear arrangement of matter, a measure of success is assured. The subject has such intrinsic importance that no one with these qualifications—and Mr. Painter has them all—can fail to produce a useful book. This is emphatically a book for the young student, for whom indeed it is intended. The mature reader has an uneasy feeling that the real difficulties are glided over. But probably the prospective author who really understood the complexity of his subject would end, like Dr. Sanday, in writing nothing.

The Holy Communion. By Bishop Gore. Mowbray. 1s. 6d. Lectures delivered in Westminster Abbey, dealing with The Gift, The Offering, and The Fellowship; marked with the qualities one expects from the author, but not adding much to what is found in his published works.

Lessons from the Crucifix. By "Pax." Mowbray. 2s. 6d. The preface by Canon Travers tells us that these meditations contain the thoughts of "a true director of souls." The title is a little misleading, because beginning with the Cross the writer goes to Advent, Christmas, and other seasons. The book may be recommended, provided the reader is not likely to be repelled by reflections as that on p. 84: "He comes leaping upon the mountains that we may be caught up into that spirit of leaping and go with Him leaping and bounding on in the joy of His companionship."

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It has devoted itself, through its Literature Committee, to the production of literature in all branches of Theology and Ethics, including the admirable One Volume Catholic Commentary on the whole Bible (S.P.C.K. 16s.) and the Second Edition of "The Catechism of Catholic Faith and Practice" (S.P.C.K., 2d.).

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In all its activities the Union seeks to co-operate with all other Catholic Societies, and looks forward hopefully to the day when all such Societies may be united and work together under one leadership for the support of Catholic Principles and Practice.

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ARNOLD PINCHARD,

Secretary.

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